Bibliographical data for
Author
Title of Edited Collection
Open MIND
Editors
Publication Date
January 2015
Publication Place
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
ISBN
9783958571112
Abstract
In this commentary, I focus on Albert Newen ’s multiplicity view ( MV ) and aim to provide an alternative framework in which it can be embedded. Newen claims that social understanding draws on at least four different epistemic mechanisms, thus rejecting the idea that there is a default mechanism for social cognition. I claim that MV runs the risk of combining elements that have been described in metaphysically incompatible theories. I will argue that multiplicity needs coherence, which can be achieved by applying the theoretical framework of first-, second-, and third-order embodiment (1-3E; Metzinger 2014 ) to the study of social cognition. The modified version of this theory, 1-3sE (first-, second-, and third-order social embodiment), can serve as a unifying framework for a pluralistic account of social understanding.