Bibliographical data for
Author
Title of Edited Collection
Open MIND
Editors
Publication Date
January 2015
Publication Place
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
ISBN
9783958570047
Abstract
The word “feeling” denotes a reactive, subjective experience with a distinctive embodied phenomenal quality. Several types of feelings are usually distinguished, such as bodily, agentive, affective, and metacognitive feelings. The hypothesis developed in this article is that all feelings are represented in a specialized, non-conceptual “expressive” mode, whose function is evaluative and action-guiding. Feelings, it is claimed, are conceptually impenetrable. Against a two-factor theory of feelings, it is argued, in the cases of affective and metacognitive feelings, that background beliefs can circumvent feelings in gaining the control of action, but cannot fully suppress them or their motivational potential.
Keywords
Affective feelings,
Affordance,
Agentive feelings,
Appraisal,
Arousal,
Bodily feelings,
Comparator,
Control,
Cues,
Evaluative,
Expressive,
Familiarity,
Fluency,
Formal object,
Illusory feeling,
Incidental feelings,
Integral feelings,
Intensity,
Metacognitive or noetic feelings,
Monitoring,
Nonconceptual content,
Predictive,
Reactive,
Resonance,
Retrospective,
Somatic marker,
Transparency,
Two-factor account,
Valence