[1]
One might argue that this move is already problematic since it looks like a petitio principii. But I simply take it as an analysis of Nagel’s phrase that there is something it is like for the organism to experience something red, say. As a characterization of phenomenal consciousness this is almost unanimously accepted in the field. What it picks out according to the present analysis is a variant aspect that differs in different experiences (qualitative character), and an invariant aspect that remains identical across different experiences (subjective character). I do not have enough space here to argue in detail for this analysis. A further reason for distinguishing both aspects, subjective and qualitative character, is the phenomenal observation that we can become conscious of ourselves as the identical subject in contrast to the constantly changing stream (or ensemble) of conscious representations. Here, the qualitative differences of the multiple representations we have at a time do not matter. What matters here is that they are related to myself such that I can call them and experience them as mine (cf. Schlicht 2011).
[2]
One way to put this with respect to sensations like hunger is to say that, since they are related to me in such an unmediated sense, it is impossible to be mistaken about the subject undergoing such sensations (Shoemaker 1968).
[3]
This claim is defended especially in opposition to what Williford calls F-theories, or varieties of first-order representationalism such as Tye’s (1995) PANIC-theory, which arguably neither accepts nor explains subjectivity so understood. Higher-order and same-order accounts at least accept this feature of consciousness, which they—mistakenly—attempt to explain in terms of representation.
[4]
Thus, the property of being conscious (and thus subjective) is not bestowed upon the episode by some external property, like a higher-order thought directed at (or representing) it (Rosenthal 2005).
[5]
I disagree with respect to what Williford calls P-Theories, according to which a “privileged object” is represented which makes all the difference between conscious and unconscious representations. Williford interprets Damasio’s theory in this way, but although various representations (of the body especially) play an important role in Damasio’s theory (as in most other theories), this is not the whole story (see fn. 7).
[6]
Another way to think of this is along the lines of the “Global Neuronal Workspace Model” in which attentional mechanisms determine which of the neural coalitions are integrated (Dehaene et al. 2006). But means other than attention are possible.
[7]
Williford discusses Damasio’s theory under the label of a P-Theory as a variety of representationalism and finds it wanting. Of course, representations of various sorts, especially of the organism, play an important role in Damasio’s theory (as in many other theories). But I do not share Williford‘s interpretation that it is these (special) representations as such that are responsible for consciousness. Various representations (or maps, as Damasio also calls them) have to be integrated in the right kind of way in order for there to be something it is like for the organism. Therefore, I do not consider Damasio’s theory a version of representationalism since there, the mechanism responsible for consciousness is not representation but integration of body representations with object representations via recurrent activations in so-called “convergence zones” (Damasio 1994, p. 95-96, 162).
[8]
A reviewer pointed out that different thinkers had different opinions about what is intentionally directed: the mental state, the psychological act, or the thinker etc. As will become clear below, I do not share the view that a mental state is itself directed, but favor the view that a creature of some sort is directed at something via an act or attitude. A great advantage of this view is that such attitudes are not limited to mental states like beliefs and desires (as traditionally held), but it also allows also for motor intentional attitudes like grasping or holding etc., i.e., essentially bodily ways of being directed (premise 4). For details see Schlicht (2008a).
[9]
I support this premise in more detail in Schlicht (forthcoming). For the purposes of this commentary it is sufficient to note the agreement on the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is relational.
[10]
Again, I argue for this premise in Schlicht (forthcoming).
[11]
An exception may be the intricate connection between cognition being embodied and (therefore) being embedded.
[12]
Talk about embodied agents is broader than talk about organisms. The biological constraints on full-blown cognitive and conscious agents are currently unknown. Whether artificial cognitive systems are possible depends on the limits set by such constraints. In this paper, I cannot address this point.
[13]
One of Brentano’s examples in his famous passage on intentionality being the mark of the mental is love, in which someone is loved. This example cannot be adequately captured by restricting intentionality to propositional attitudes which can be formulated using “that-clauses”.
[14]
Many forms of being intentionally directed are sensorimotor, e.g., all that has to do with perception and action, this being the biologically primary form of intentionality (Searle 1983, p. 36).
[15]
Most cognitive varieties of intentionality are sophisticated and propositional, like beliefs and desires, which can be put into sentences containing “that-clauses”, e.g., Ken believes that physicalism is true.
[16]
The limits of this commentary do not permit an exhaustive discussion of possible objections to this account, but I discuss it at greater length in Schlicht (forthcoming).