Bayne, T. & Montague, M. (2011). Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bayne, T. (2010). The unity of consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18 (2), 227-287. 10.1017/S0140525X00038188
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2001). Elements of mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes' error. New York, NY: Avon Books.
— (1999). The feeling of what happens. New York, NY: Basic Books.
— (2010). Self comes to mind. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Dehaene, S. (2014). Consciousness and the brain. Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. New York, NY: Viking.
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J. & Sergent, C. (2006). Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10 (5), 1-8. 10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Edelman, G. M. & Tononi, G. (2000). A universe of consciousness: How matter becomes imagination. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Frank, M. (2007). Non-objectal subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14 (5-6), 152-173. 10.1007/s11098-011-9837-8
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, A. & de Vignemont, F. (2009). Is social cognition embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13 (4), 154-159. 10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.007
Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.) Philosophy of mind. Classical and contemporary readings (pp. 520-533). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hutto, D. D. & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism. Basic minds without content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kant, I. (1999). Critique of pure reason. In A. Wood & P. Guyer (Eds.) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kelly, S. (2002). Merleau-Ponty on the body: The logic of motor intentionality. Ratio, 15 (4), 376-391. 10.1111/1467-9329.00198
Keysers, C. (2013). The empathic brain. Groningen, NL: Social Brain Press.
Koch, C. (2004). The quest for consciousness. Englewood, CL: Roberts & Company.
Kriegel, U. & Williford, K. (Eds.) (2006). Self-representational approaches to consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
— (2013). Phenomenal intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. (1995). Faster than thought. Holism, homogeneity and temporal coding. In T. Metzinger (Ed.) Conscious experience (pp. 425-461). Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.
— (2003). Being no one. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
— (2011). The no-self alternative. In S. Gallagher (Ed.) The oxford handbook of the self (pp. 279-296). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Milner, A. D. & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The visual brain in action. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83 (4), 435-450.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to think that p? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69 (1), 1-36. 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x
Rizzolatti, G. & Sinigaglia, C. (2008). Mirrors in the brain. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, D. (2005). Consciousness and mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Scherer, Klaus R. (2009). The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model. Cognition & Emotion, 23 (7), 1307-1351. 10.1080/02699930902928969
Schlicht, T. (2007). Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus. Das Problem der Erklärungslücke in Geist-Gehirn-Theorien. Paderborn, GER: Mentis.
— (2008a). Ein Stufenmodell der Intentionalität. In P. Spät (Ed.) Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes (pp. 59-91). Paderborn, GER: Mentis.
— (2008b). Selbstgefühl. Damasios Stufentheorie des Bewusstseins und der Emotion. In E. Düsing (Ed.) Geist und Psyche (pp. 337-369). Würzburg, GER: Königshausen & Neumann.
— (2011). Non-conceptual content and the subjectivity of consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 19 (3), 489-518. 10.1080/09672559.2011.595197
— (forthcoming). Selves, or something near enough. In S. Grätzel (Ed.) Buddhism and Bioethics.
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge, MA: MiIT Press.
— (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shoemaker, S. (1968). Self-reference and self-awareness. Journal of Philosophy, 65 (19), 555-567. 10.2307/2024121
Strawson, G. (1997). The self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4 (5-6), 405-428.
— (2004). Real intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3 (3), 287-313. 10.1023/B:PHEN.0000049306.63185.0f
Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Van Gulick, R. (2004). Higher-order global states. In R. Gennaro (Ed.) Higher-order theories of consciousness (pp. 67-92). Amsterdam, NL: John Benjamins.
Vosgerau, G., Schlicht, T. & Newen, A. (2008). Orthogonality of phenomenality and content. American Philosophical Quarterly, 45 (4), 329-348.
Welpinghus, A. (2013). Emotions as natural and social kinds. (Unpublished)
Williford, K. (2015). Reprensentationalisms, subjective character, and self-acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND. Frankfurt a. M., GER: MIND Group.
Wilson, R. & Foglia, L. (2011). Embodied cognition. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta (Ed.) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/
Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-awareness and alterity. A phenomenological investigation. Englewood, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Zeki, S. & Bartels, A. (1998). The autonomy of the visual systems and the modularity of conscious vision. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 353 (1377), 1911-1914. 10.1098/rstb.1998.0343
Zeki, S. (2007). A theory of micro-consciousness. In M. Velmans & S. Schneider (Eds.) The Blackwell companion to consciousness (pp. 580-588). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.