Abundant experimental evidence demonstrates that human beings are systems comprised of the brain as part of a body and the environment in a constant regulatory, adaptive process. Consequently, we suggest a systems view that considers such complex feedback loops in terms of circular causality (Crafa & Nagel forthcoming). As there are manifold fluctuating organismic levels that create feedback loops for continuous adaptation, studying those feedback loops will in all likelihood improve our understanding of how our experience is action-oriented and based on skillful engagement with the world. Notably, this approach does not in itself forestall by definition the assumption of representations (see e.g., Dennett 2000). I suggest that a computational view of cognition might not be opposed to the dynamic, embodied view. It is likely that we need both approaches in order to understand how self-organizing dynamic systems constantly adapting to their environment are able to reason, solve abstract problems, use language, etc (c.f., for another synthesizing suggestion, Grush 2004). Computational explanations of how the body and the environment interact can be useful tools here, possibly benefiting from ideas such as predictive coding or deep learning in Artificial Intelligence.[6] Such a step includes blurring the boundaries between cognitive and sensory-motor processes. So-called low-level and high-level processes cannot be understood independently, since they constantly interact and influence one another. While symbolic abstraction is necessary for reasoning, problem solving, or language, those are strongly coupled to lower-level processes, such as perception, object manipulation, or movement. Much conceptual and empirical work must be undertaken, for which a mixed methods approach considering multiple dimensions seems to be necessary and most promising. Such an approach —or better, combination of approaches—can help to integrate multiple levels of analysis. It might combine neurobiological concepts (and these on different levels as well, reaching from molecular studies up to studying systems and interacting systems) with psychological, anthropological, and philosophical studies. For the laboratory, a systems approach would ask for frameworks that allow us to study ‘active’ subjects using a variety of methods. Mobile technologies for physiological measurements are an important step towards this goal, as are set-ups that combine different physiological measurements. This is an ambitious task, which demands technological and computational innovation and effort. And, not least, studying mental capacities can be massively enriched by combining phenomenological accounts of experience with cognitive science approaches as suggested from the field of neurophenomenology (Varela 1996).
It is likely that a more holistic view on human cognition and experience will help us focus on topics that truly matter to people and that do justice to their experience. One practical consequence of a different understanding of the relationship between mind, body, and world is its potential effect on human self-understanding, which in turn can have significant psychological effects (e.g., Vohs & Schooler 2008). As Gregory Bateson frames it: “[t]he living man is thus bound within a net of epistemological and ontological premises which—regardless of ultimate truth or falsity—become partially self-validating for him” (Bateson 1973, p. 314). Thus, theoretical considerations in the field of philosophy of mind, together with the pragmatists’ understanding of experience and neuroscientific findings on the relevance of the interdependence of the brain, the rest of the body, and the environment shall lead to thicker descriptions of the multifaceted human condition.