In the following, approaches in the empirical sciences that seek to consider the dynamic, interactionist nature of cognition will be introduced in order to enrich the view of the complexities of adaptive behaviour in self-organizing systems.
Computational cognitive neuroscientist Olaf Sporns provides a state-of-the-art synthesis of the sciences of complex networks in the brain and suggests a view beyond neurocentrism. He introduces his work as follows:
To understand these systems, we require not only knowledge of elementary systems components but also knowledge of the ways in which these components interact and the emergent properties of their interactions […]. We cannot fully understand brain function unless we approach the brain on multiple scales, by identifying the networks that bind cells into coherent populations, organize cell groups into functional brain regions, integrate regions into systems, and link brain and body in a complete organism. (Sporns 2011, pp. 1–3)
While he does not (yet) consider the further complexities that come into play when one includes the environment of the organism, his description can be seen as a relevant, though timid first step away from a purely neurocentric view. The next step will be to recognize the relevance of environmentally attuned actions, i.e. to investigate how actions can be understood, rather than as isolated from the environment, as being in constant dynamic relation with it, adapting to requirements from the environment and in turn shaping it.
There is no doubt that the developmental perspective is crucial for understanding the dynamic interplay between social and biological processes and thus the role of the environment for experiences in developing cognition. From early childhood onwards, the brain is shaped by constant interaction with the world. Experiences impact on brain structure and function, as demonstrated by abundant evidence on the brain’s plasticity (for classical studies, see: Buonomano & Merzenich 1998, Pascual-Leone et al. 2005). Susan Oyama, in her account of developmental systems theory, argues that the mind–world dichotomy inherent in descriptions that follow dualistic accounts claiming strong gaps between the biological realm and sociocultural realm cannot do justice to evolving systems. Oyama invites us to focus on change, rather than constancy. She points to the conglomerate of heterogeneous influences that allows development. A developmental system is “a heterogeneous and causally complex mix of interacting entities and influences that produces the life cycle of an organism” (Oyama 2000, p. 1). This multi-scale, interaction-driven dynamics requires an approach that does justice to context-dependency, since it is a particular context that leads to the emergence of a specific phenotype. Neglecting the context would thus necessarily lead to a failure to understand the developmental system.
Complementary to this view, Tim Ingold describes how the specificities of an environment and an organism’s history with it matter for its very existence:
What goes for the relations between internal parts of the whole organism also goes for the relations between the organism and its environment. Organic forms come into being and are maintained because of a perpetual interchange with their environments not in spite of it […]. But since an ‘environment’ can only be recognized in relation to an organism whose environment it is—since, in other words, it is the figure that constitutes the ground—the process of formation of the organism is the process of formation of its environment […]. Moreover, the interface between them is not one of external contact between separate and mutually exclusive domains, for enfolded within the organism itself is the entire history of its environmental conditions. (Ingold 1990, p. 216).
Consequently, rather than speaking of distinct organisms, Ingold suggests that we would be better served by speaking of the “whole-organism-in-its-environment” (Ingold 2001). In a similar way, Richard Menary suggests cognitive integration as a dynamical account of how the bodily processes of an organism in its environment lead to cognition (Menary 2007), and elaborates how manipulation of the organism’s specific environment, development in that environment, and the resulting transformation of cognitive capacities in this cognitive niche matter for actual cognitive processes and our explanatory models thereof (Menary 2010).
In line with such descriptions, Andreas Engel et al. (2013) recently noted what they saw as a “pragmatic turn” in cognitive science, a turn that leaves aside frameworks focusing on computation over mental representation to instead study cognition as being essentially action-oriented. Building on reasoning from Clark (1997) and Varela et al. (1991), Engel and colleagues focus on the relevance of action for cognition. They discuss evidence of perception as not being neutral with respect to action but rather as part of sensorimotor couplings that are always specific for the organism, given its previous learning, experiences, and expectations. This focus implies embodiment and situatedness just as the context-sensitivity of processing. The “pragmatic turn” is based on much experimental evidence from studies on sensorimotor integration and neuronal plasticity that highlight how cognition is, in a fundamental way, grounded in action.
Taken together with many more research lines in the experimental field, these approaches can further our understanding of the essential value of what beforehand was seen to be “merely” subjective, and not necessarily real. Experience and skillful engagement with the world have a relevant, even an essential role for cognition. This insight opens the way for a more encompassing view of human experience and thus enriches Jordan and Day’s account with phenomenological, anthropological, and pragmatist perspectives.