[1]
From the viewpoint of the somatic feeling theory of emotions, emotions can be explained as a somatic change caused by the perception, real or simulated, of a particular object. See James (1884, p. 190), and Damasio (1994, 2003). Other theorists of emotion, however, consider that the conscious experience of having an emotion includes propositional attitudes, and not only feelings. See sections 4 and 5 below. Moods are long-term affective states, and will not concern us here.
[2]
On this concept, see Mangan (1993, 2000) and Reber et al. (2002).
[3]
See the analysis of this example in Goldie (2002), p. 56.
[4]
On this contrast, see Frank (1988), Griffiths (1997), and Prinz (2004, pp. 82-83). On whether they qualify as emotions, see Ekman (1992).
[5]
As observed by Goldie (2009), some feelings, for example, [feeling anxious] or [feeling depressed], seem to lack a formal object, which is typically the case with moods. As indicated above, moods will not be discussed in this article.
[6]
Bechara et al. (2000) make it clear that the somatic marker theory applies to action, whether it engages affects or not.
[7]
see Logan & Crump 2010 and Nieuwenhuis et al. 2001
[8]
Automaticity in appraisal is central to Ekman’s analysis of primary emotions (1992). See also Griffiths (1997), Prinz (2004), and Zajonc (1980). On informational encapsulation, see Fodor (1983).
[9]
For example, fearlessness in the presence of danger may result from a disturbed childhood.
[10]
Some affective feelings, however, can be intentionally controlled in the long run, through cultural learning. See Murata et al. (2013).
[11]
Non-conscious error signals can also guide corrective steps, without the agent noticing them.
[12]
Pat Haggard et al. (2002) have demonstrated the crucial role of the temporal binding between felt initiation of action and output in the sense of being the agent of an action. See, among other articles, Haggard et al. (2002).
[13]
This prediction involves judgments of learning (JOL). See Koriat & Ackerman (2010).
[14]
On FORs, see Thompson et al. (2011).
[15]
Rhesus monkeys have been found to opt out of more or less challenging perceptual or memory trials as a result of trial difficulty. For a summary of the results and a methodological discussion of their significance, see Beran et al. (2012), Chapter 1, and Proust (2013), Chapter 5.
[16]
For a defense of emotional representations as nonconceptual and action oriented, see Griffiths & Scarantino (2009).
[17]
See Proust (2009, 2013). Prinz (2004) briefly discusses this idea in connection with the intentional content of emotions (p. 228). See also Griffiths & Scarantino (2009): in emotion, “the environment is represented in terms of what it affords to the emoter in the way of skillful engagement with it.”
[18]
For a review of the theories of valence, see Prinz (2004), Ch. 7. Prinz takes valence to be a different determinate experience in each feeling. On valence as determined by overall value, from a consumer semantics viewpoint, rather than as an experience of pleasure/displeasure, see Carruthers (2011), pp. 127–130. This view, however, does not build on the nonconceptual information being felt, but rather on its being represented “in an abstract and amodal way”, which, nevertheless, is motivating.
[19]
These expressive representations do not require a system to have the capacity to form propositional representations. They are close to what Strawson called “a featural representational system”, allowing an animal to navigate with no propositional thinking (1959). On the comparison between the two representational modes, see Proust (2013). The question of the penetrability of feelings by propositional thought is explored below, in section 5.
[20]
In a similar vein, William James writes that, in emotions, “the whole organism is a sounding board” (1890, vol. 2, p. 450).
[21]
For a defence of this view in terms of situated cognition, see Griffiths & Scarantino (2009). The authors emphasise the environmental scaffolding that makes possible affordance detection in emoters.
[22]
When we say that a feeling is felt, “felt” is not intended to mean “perceived”, but, rather, “entertained”.
[23]
About the nature and role of nonconceptual norms, see Proust (2013).
[24]
An alternative proposal by Carruthers (2011) sees as a condition of transparency of an affective feeling, rather, that the corresponding appraisal include the detection of the details of the associated nonconceptual somatic markers, which makes the recognition of a specific emotion possible, as well as its subsequent global broadcast—hence making this information available to the mindreading system. This analytic view of feelings, however, makes it utterly mysterious how a given pattern of autonomic measures is ever recognized, among thousands of similar patterns, as distinctive of an emotion. On the present view, a feeling is produced within a given forward model, which automatically activates the comparator for this affordance. Transparency, then, is effective only when a given forward model is activated, and does not need to transfer to a verbal modality. This seems to be recognized in part by Peter Carruthers, when he concludes that “we can have transparent access to the strength of only our occurrent context-bound affective attitudes” (2011, p. 146).
[25]
As Gordon observes, “one will not experience fear unless one connects up that cognition with the arousal one feels. To do this requires, according to him, a second cognition: a recognition or belief that is one’s being (or taking oneself to be) in a situation of danger that is causing the arousal one feels. This "cognitivist" objection is correct when targeting S and S’s theory, who also defend a cognitivist view of feelings. The present view, however, proposes a non-doxastic account of feelings, and is thus immune to this objection.”
[26]
Arango-Muñoz (2012) claims that feelings of forgetting and feelings of knowing are cases of “conceptual experiences”. According to the present view, following the lead of Koriat and colleagues, M-feelings can overlap with judgments, and be redescribed in conceptual terms; they pertain, however, to different representational levels. There are no “conceptual experiences”, except in the sense of experiencing the comparative fluency of concepts.
[27]
As indicated above, rhesus monkeys are able, in a perceptual or memory task, to opt out of more or less challenging trials as a result of trial difficulty.
[28]
As will transpire below, all these cues are, as far as we know, dimensions or effects of fluency, i.e., of ease of processing.
[29]
See Kepecs et al. (2008). An interesting account of the predictive activity reflected in noetic feelings is that the dynamic activity in the neurons activated by a given task correlates with the so-called “accumulation of evidence” that is diagnostic of success or failure in that task. For example, in a perceptual discrimination task, where a target might be categorized as an X or as a Y, evidence for each alternative is accumulated in parallel, until the difference exceeds a threshold, which triggers the perceptual decision. The information that will generate a feeling consists, first, in the differential rate of accumulation of evidence for the two (or more) possible responses, and second, in stored information about the threshold value, computed from prior trials, which the rate of accumulation should reach in order to make a cognitive decision likely to be correct. For a discussion and review of the literature, see Fleming & Dolan (2012), and Proust (2013, pp. 99).
[30]
Jacoby & Whitehouse (1989) similarly argue that a feeling of fluency can be experienced as familiarity in a memory task, and as confidence in a problem-solving task.
[31]
For a defence of the distinction see Jacoby & Brooks (1984), Koriat & Levy-Sadot (1999), Recanati (2002) and Smith & DeCoster (1999). Koriat & Levy-Sadot (1999) both emphasize the distinction and use the term “inference” in both cases.
[32]
There is abundant evidence, however, that M-feelings uncritically guide epistemic decision (i.e., are unopposed by concept-based processes) mostly when the cognitive task is unimportant, when cognitive resources are limited (under time pressure or divided attention), and when agents are in a good mood (Nussinson & Koriat 2008; Schwarz 2004).
[33]
This two-factor account is endorsed by Unkelbach (2007): “the feeling resulting from the discrepancy is non specific, and the discrepancy triggers a search for an explanation […]. The experienced variations are not attributed to prior exposure, resulting in a feeling of familiarity, but to some other quality of the statement, namely, that a statement is true.”
[34]
A quote from Smith & DeCoster (1999), p. 329, who offer a strong defence of this view.
[35]
Even in this domain, however, an error signal, when conscious, is associated with an unpleasant feeling.