I am grateful to Sascha Benjamin Fink for a thoughtful and insightful critique (Fink 2015) of my article (Block 2015). Fink’s critique is full of novel and interesting ideas, formulations and proposals but is far too rich for me to respond to everything. I will focus on Fink’s arguments to the effect that the concept of phenomenal precision is defective because there will be no unique precision to a phenomenal experience, specifically that phenomenal precision is either contradictory or trivialized by a “minimal” or “maximal” interpretation. I think Fink is right to focus on the concept of phenomenal precision since as he says it is the aspect of my paper that most needs clarification. I argue that the key to solving the problem that Fink raises is to ask what the representationist should say about it. I then argue that the anti-representationist can make a similar move. In the last section I consider some variants of Fink’s proposal for how to clarify phenomenal precision.