[1]
For the distinction between representational and configurational aspects see Wollheim (1987). Nanay (2005) used these termini vis-à-vis aesthetic pictorial experiences. We may apply this distinction to experiences more generally.
[2]
See also the article in this collection.
[3]
At least, most often explanations are seen as asymmetric. For example, Schindler (2013) has remarked that the mechanistic explanations à la Craver (2007) violate asymmetry, which he sees as a shortcoming of Craver’s account.
[4]
This is not his first argument against Representationism (see e.g., Block 1996), but I will focus mainly on his The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision in this collection.
[5]
This has become somewhat like a signature move for Block. Consider e.g.: “You ask: What is it that philosophers have called qualitative states? I answer, only half in jest: As Louis Armstrong said when asked what jazz is, ‘If you got to ask, you aint never gonna get to know.’” (Block 1991, p. 217)
Or: “I cannot define [phenomenal consciousness] in any remotely noncircular way. I don’t consider this an embarrassment. The history of reductive definitions in philosophy should lead one not to expect a reductive definition of anything. The best one can do for [phenomenal consciousness] is in some respects worse than for many other concepts, though, because really all one can do is point to the phenomenon (cf. Goldman 1993a). Nonetheless, it is important to point properly.” (Block 1997, p. 230)
He continues by stating that synonyms and examples are the best way of conveying what is meant by “phenomenal consciousness”.
I do not thank that this is unreasonable, but instead intellectually honest. Chalmers (2011, p. 545) may have provided a good explanation of why it is so hard to provide a real definition for “phenomenality”: It might be a bedrock concept, which cannot be decomposed into more basic concepts, because it is itself most basic—it captures the fundamental distinction between reality and its appearance to us:
“[…] a dispute is bedrock relative to an expression: so the dispute over ‘Mice are conscious’ might be bedrock with respect to ‘conscious’ but not with respect to ‘mice’. A substantive dispute is bedrock relative to an expression E when no underlying dispute can be found by applying the method of elimination to E [i.e., replacing E in disputes by another expression where people agree on the meaning]: roughly, when there is no underlying dispute that does not involve E or cognates.”
If an expression is bedrock, then it cannot be elucidated by conceptual analysis—and there cannot be any non-stipulative real definition.
[6]
This is in the spirit of Burge (2010, pp. 55–60), whom Block cites in this context.
[7]
See also table 1. We may also introduce the following formalism: Ch(x) stands for the character of a percept of x (the external stimulus); Ch(x&y) stands for the character of perceiving stimuli x and y together, i.e., a mereological fusion of simultaneously occurring characters at a moment in time t. The comparative character is then:
SFAG: Ch(g22) ≠ Ch(g28)
SPAF: Ch(g22&g28)≈(Ch(g22) ≠ Ch(g28))
SPAH: Ch(g22&g28)≈(Ch(g22) ≠ Ch(g28))
SPAL: Ch(g22&g28)≈(Ch(g22) = Ch(g28))
Note that just because phenomenal parts share identical phenomenal character, these parts themselves need not be identical: they may occur at different moments in time, be part of different phenomenal wholes, or be arranged in a different manner; if any of these extrinsic properties were among the identity conditions of phenomenal parts, then a ≠ b; however, the character of some a may still be identical to the character of b.
If phenomenally-unified percepts are mereologically organized, as suggested by Bayne (2010), as well as Wiese & Metzinger (2012), then: if a percept at t1 has Ch(x&y)t1=(Ch(x)t1≠Ch(y)t1) and a percept at t2 has Ch(x&y)t2=(Ch(x)t2=Ch(y)t2), then Ch(x)t1≠Ch(x)t2 or Ch(y)t1≠Ch(y)t2. This is the case in the experiment by Carrasco et al. (2004, p. 310); so under these presumptions, the appearances of parts of the overall percept must change between the conditions, because the character of the whole changes.
[8]
That is, the point of subjective equality (PSE) differs between the conditions. PSEs are determined by that configuration where a forced choice between stimuli is chancy. Carrasco et al. (see 2004, p. 311, figure 5a) kept a g22 fixed (standard) and varied the other patch (test). So one condition (cue to test) covered what I call here SPAH and SPAL, as in some cases, the test patch had a lower, in some a higher contrast than the standard g22. (This is merely a difference in presentation, which does not influence the overall argument. Their presentation simply provides a continuous psychometric curve.) If the fixation spot was cued, the PSE reflects reality: a g22 looks most like g22; if the standard (g22) was cued, the test patch had to have a higher contrast to look similar: a g28 looked most like a g22; if the test patch was cued, the uncued patch had to have a lower contrast to look most similar to the test: a g16 looked most like a g22.
[9]
The actual content is a bit more imprecise, i.e., within the range of 1 foveal contrast-JND, which is roughly 1%. Block suggests 2% overall. In personal communication, Frank Jäkel estimated that (under ideal experimental conditions with optimal stimuli) the contrast-JND could be a log-unit lower than that: 1% provides a good ballpark estimate for many conditions. He based this estimation on his own work done for the study published in Jäkel & Wichmann (2006). See also Carney et al. (2000), Pelli & Bex (2013), and the locus classicus: Fechner (1860, pp. 150ff.).
[10]
See Banks et al. (1991, p. 1779). Although they do not specifically mention JNDs, they do provide data about contrast sensitivity in different degrees of peripheral eccentricity, which suggests some increase: “[T]he ideal [contrast sensitivity functions] do not exhibit the large contrast sensitivity losses that one observes in humans with increasing eccentricity.”
[11]
Block might argue that we lack a principled reason to choose one over the other as being more or less imprecise. The argument mirrors the one he gives concerning veridicality (see Block this collection, pp. 26ff.). As veridicality determines the contents of percepts, one can easily adapt it: intuitively, one might think that the patch one attends to is more veridical; but attention changes appearance, so the unattended one might be more veridical; but as one mostly acts on what one attends to, it would be advantageous if what one acts on was most veridical. So we are stuck in a rut. The comparative percept in SPAL is illusory, but as a percept, it must be (partially) veridical. Block’s suggestion is (or ought to be) that we should assume that each is veridical, but less r–precise. I’d agree. But I think we can do more: when we focus on the higher contrast Gabor, this increases the distance in r–precision between the compared percepts, and thereby ought to render them more discernible. If so, then this might apply to SPAL as well, such that the one we attend to is more precise. I pick up on this in footnote 12.
[12]
See table 2. More formally, let Co(x) stand for the content of our percept of x, and Co(x&y) for the content of the comparative percept of x and y together. Given the external content-determination of percepts and our understanding of JNDs, we can be a bit more precise about how imprecise content is in the different conditions.
SFAG: Co(g22)=22± ∼1%; Co(g28)=28± ∼1%
SPAF: Co(g22&g28)≈(Co(g22)≥ 22± ∼3%,Co(g28)≥28%± ∼3%)
SPAH: Co(g22&g28)≈(Co(g22)≥22± ∼3%,Co(g28)≥28%± ∼2%)
SPAL: Co(g22&g28)≈(Co(g22)≥[22%,28%],Co(g28)»[22%,28%])
[13]
One reviewer doubted whether this holds generally. It might be that a weaker version is easier to defend: an appearance does not necessarily specify whether it is attended to or not. I suspect that Block tends towards a stronger reading, as it seems to be in line with the dissociation between phenomenal consciousness and access. My reconstruction hinges on the strong version. For otherwise, the stability of p–precision I suggest in section 3.4.3 does not arise. So if there are good reasons to doubt the strong version, there are good reasons to doubt my reconstruction ↓ and also Block’s argument itself, I believe. Here, I simply admit this weakness, but cannot follow up on this criticism due to lack of space. However, I see no good reason for assuming that attention has a unique and distinguishable perceptual character. (It might even be contentious whether it has a cognitive, agentive, or any phenomenal character at all, but I will not get into this here.)
[14]
It is unclear whether the identity in character must be part of the experience for Block’s argument. It seems that he thinks this way. But consider Williamson (1990, p. 60; my emphasis), who writes that the “discriminability of a pair of characters as presented by a pair of experiences depends on non-qualitative relations between the experiences — relations not fixed by the way in which the experiences present their characters — which facilitate or hinder discrimination […].” He envisions where the compared characters are placed in time and the visual field, but one might also consider, as I do in section 4.3, that our ability or inability to tell characters apart is a dependent on our cognitive abilities.
[15]
We cannot give the exact value of n, because the character of a percept is independent of whether one attends to it or foveates on it; and in SPAL, percepts of different actual contrast can share the same character. So we cannot associate the p–precision value with any value pertaining to a stimulus. Still, we may assume that it has a value. So I use some mock-value n.
[16]
Block’s main argument rests on (P2)↓ but I hope that (P1) is in his spirit.
[17]
Likely but not necessarily, because experiencing as crimson is not necessarily related to experiencing as red. Conceptual or nomological relations do not necessarily transfer to the realm of experiences. Imagine seeing an animal as a mouse. One does not thereby see it as an owner of a heart, or as a member of the phylum chordata even though all mice belong to each category necessarily.
[18]
See also the discussion and specifically Block’s response R2 on Block (2007) for more on generic phenomenology.
[19]
I speak as if we could know the determinate value of p–precision given as a real number here. But this is not required: There could be a determinate value without us being able to know it.
[20]
The rule might be cultural, as with language, but also natural, as with causes: that the word “red” means the color ■ is based on a cultural rule; that smoke means fire is based on a natural rule.
[21]
This case has been made by Kosslyn (1980, p. 31) as well as Gombrich (2002). But see also Haugeland (1981), Lewis (1971), and Jackson (1960).
[22]
A reviewer noted that the limits of our vocabulary and our verbalization skills more generally might account for the lack of discrimination skills just as well as introspective imprecision. Even though this is a valuable point, I do not develop it here. First because I want to stick as close to the occurrent percepts as possible, not to our cognitive grasp of such percepts; second because introspective access precedes verbalization of the introspected; and third because failures of verbalization do not account for “introspective data”. Block is unapologetic about taking introspection seriously; a supportive critic should take it seriously as well.
[23]
Many philosophers liken introspection to a form of perception, e.g., Locke (2008, II.xxvii.§9 & II.i.§4), Kant (2008, AA,III,tr.Äst.,§2), Brentano (1874), James (1890), Boring (1953, p. 170), Armstrong (1980, p. 61), Lycan (1996, p. 334), and to some degree Goldman (2006, pp. 242ff.) as well as Churchland (1985, 2005).
[24]
This differs from the argument Block discusses: the attentional effect could be perceptual and conscious, but it is not really accessible what or how much actually changes in these circumstances due to introspective imprecision.
[25]
The difference is one of 16.777.216 to 64 different colors.