[1]
In fact, Eric Schwitzgebel (2008) points out that there is a new trend of relying on introspection, even though this method itself is not new and its disadvantages were pointed out with the failure of introspective psychology at the beginning of the 20th century (c.f. Lyons 1986).
[2]
While in this commentary I will only concentrate on the influence of introspection on intuitive judgments, it is also worth noticing that both phenomena can also influence each other in the opposite direction. One factor that makes introspective insights feel so reliable at first glance is their intuitiveness. This would be a case in which intuition influences introspection.
[3]
A further hint at the equal treatment of introspection is the Latin origin of the term ‘introspicere‘, which can be translated as ‘to examine’ or ‘to look into’.
[4]
Here again the Latin origin ‘intueri‘, which can be translated as ‘to view’ or also as ‘to examine’, underlines not only the folk psychological connection between intuition and perception but also the similarity between introspection and intuition.
[5]
For a general discussion of what counts, or should count as evidence, see Williamson (2007).
[6]
This does not mean that one always deliberately introspects or intuits. This would be trivially false (Sosa 1998). What is meant is that one can in principle guide one’s attention to the relevant mental state if necessary.
[7]
It is important to notice that the “phenomenology of certainty” presupposes a “phenomenology of knowing”. This is best regarded as the “phenomenology of knowing that one knows”. For my purposes here the “phenomenology of knowing”, though important, is not the interesting phenomenal aspect of intuitions or introspective insights. I hold the “phenomenology of certainty” far more interesting, because I think that it is that phenomenology that leads to the strong sense of infallibility of intuitive, as well as introspective judgments.
[8]
The cases he describes in that paper are from the same domains of experience that Bayne discusses in his article for this volume namely emotion, visual perception, and cognitive phenomenology.
[9]
Note that due to restrictions of space I will cover only, the most relevant interpretation of introspection, which can be described as a sort of inward perception. The word “perception” here is to be read in a metaphorical way. It is not meant to express a commitment to something along the lines of a higher-order perception view on introspection (Güzeldere 1995). Rather this inward “perception” can be understood as kind metacognition that helps a subject to conceptualize her own experiences. For a more detailed distinction between different kinds and qualities of introspection, see Metzinger (2003, p. 35).
[10]
Though this might not be a problem for relying on introspection in the case of perception, it becomes more pressing when it comes to using introspective data to inform epistemology or methodology.
[11]
A further methodological problem that needs to be taken into consideration is the fact that when collecting data about introspective or intuitive states one has to rely on a subject’s report about the relevant mental state. This can be a possible source of contamination, which makes an investigation of the phenomena even more difficult (Cummins 1998).
[12]
Even if this role is then obviously a minor one in forming a belief about the world.
[13]
In addition to these findings, it is also an advantage of treating intuitions as reflections on personal concepts, because such a view is likely to be naturalized (Goldman 2007). Arguments from obscurity or empirical implausibility of the type that have been raised against other construals of intuition, such as Platonic insights into the laws of nature (Brendel 2004), can thus be avoided.
[14]
Surely this is a very simplified and rough description of concept acquisition. Further details should be empirically investigated, but due to limited space, and for and the purposes of my argument, this must suffice.
[15]
The scaffold here would be the proper use of a word or concept in its respective culture or context. Further, notice that it is also possible to have several types of scaffolding at the same time, like conceptual expertise (i.e. cases in which a person has a significant amount of background knowledge about special concept) plus the above-mentioned cultural scaffolding. For a defence of conceptual expertise, see Williamson (2011).