Alexander, J. (2012). Experimental philosophy: An introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Bayne, T. & Spener, M. (2010). Introspective humility. Philosophical Issues, 20 (1), 1-22. 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00176.x
Bayne, T. (2015). Introspective Insecurity. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND. Frankfurt a. M.: Mind Group.
Bealer, G. (1997). Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In M. de Paul & W. Ramsey (Eds.) Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry (pp. 201-239). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bieri, P. (2007). Was bleibt von der analytischen Philosophie? Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 55 (3), 333-344. 10.1524/dzph.2007.55.3.333
Brendel, E. (2004). Intuition pumps and the proper use of thought experiments. Dialectica, 58 (1), 89-108. 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00293.x
Cappelen, H. (2012). Philosophy without intuitions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Cullen, S. (2010). Survey driven romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1 (2), 275-296. 10.1007/s13164-009-0016-1
Cummins, R. (1998). Reflection on reflective equilibrium. In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds.) Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry (pp. 113-127). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Gettier, E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23 (6), 121-123. 10.1093/analys/23.6.121
Goldman, A. (2007). Philosophical intuitions: Their target, their source, and their epistemic status. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74 (1), 1-26.
Güzeldere, G. (1995). Is consciousness the perception of what passes in one’s own mind? In T. Metzinger (Ed.) Conscious experience (pp. 335-357). Paderborn, GER: Schöningh.
Knobe, J. (2007). Experimental philosophy. Philosophy Compass, 2 (1), 81-92. 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00050.x
Locke, J. (1975). An essay concerning human understanding. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Lyons, W. (1986). The disappearance of introspection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2014). Die phänomenale Signatur des Wissens: Experimentelle Philosophie des Geistes mit oder ohne Intuitionen? In T. Grundmann, J. Horvath & J. Kipper (Eds.) Die experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion (pp. 279-321). Berlin, GER: Suhrkamp.
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pust, J. (2014). Intuition. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring E. N. Zalta (Ed.) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/intuition/
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008). The unreliability of naïve introspection. Philosophical Review, 117 (2), 245-273. 10.1215/00318108-2007-037
Sosa, E. (1998). Minimal intuition. In M. de Paul & W. Ramsey (Eds.) Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry (pp. 257-269). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. (2008). Normativity and epistemic intuitions. In J. Knobe & S. Nichols (Eds.) Experimental philosophy (pp. 17-45). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
— (2011). Philosophical expertise and the burden of proof. Metaphilosophy, 42 (3), 215-229. 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01685.x