In the following I will play the “argumentation game” and for a moment assume that what Eliasmith presents us with actually is argumentation. The goal of this section is not to claim that Eliasmith really argues for the emergence of artificial minds in the classical way. Rather, I wish to highlight that possibly more than technological equipment and biologically inspired hardware need to be taken into account before research can present us with a mind, as outlined by Eliasmith. If we deconstruct his line of reasoning and virtually formalize the argument, we don't find valid argumentation but rather a set of highly educated—and certainly informative—claims about the future, which doubtlessly help us prepare for a future not too far ahead of us. I will utilize the terms “argumentation”, “argument”, “premise”, and “conclusion” in the following, but it should always be remembered that these terms are only “virtually” or hypothetically. So let us see how Eliasmith proceeds:
If we play the argumentation game, a first result is that Eliasmith’s virtual argument becomes problematic at the moment he starts elaborating on theoretical developments that have been made and that will propel forward the development of “brain-like models” (this collection, p. 6). From the perspective of an incautious reader, the entire section “Theoretical developments” could be seen as resulting in a claim that can be traced back to a petitio principii. This means that the conclusion drawn at the end of the argumentative line is identical with at least one of the implicit premises. The implicit argumentation is made up of three relevant parts and unfolds as follows: first, building brain-like models is not only a matter of the available technological equipment (ibid., first paragraph; cf. premise 1). Instead, if we face a convincing artificially-minded agent, it is characterized by both sophisticated technological equipment and by our discovery of principles of how the brain functions, such as learning or motor control (ibid.; cf. premise 2). And so, in conclusion, it follows that if biological understanding and technological equipment come together, we will be able to build brain-like models and implement them in highly sophisticated cognitive agents (ibid.).
The incautious reader would now have to believe that Eliasmith is confusing necessary and sufficient conditions. Let us look at this assumed argument in some more detail. Formulated as a complete argument we would get: “If it is not the case that technological equipment alone leads to the building of brain-like models for artificial cognitive agents, but we face a good artificial minded agent which is endowed with certain technology as well as biologically inspired hardware, we have to conclude that this certain technology and biologically inspired hardware are not only necessary, but also sufficient for building brain-like models for artificial cognitive agents.”
The formal expression of this argument would be the following:
T: We have developed sophisticated technological equipment.
B: We have developed biologically-inspired hardware.
M: We can build brain-like models which can be implemented in artificial cognitive agents.
As is obvious from how the argument is constructed, it is invalid. So, what we can say at this point is that the combination of both technical features and biologically-inspired neuromorphic hardware very likely does get us some way, but we might have to consider which elements are missing so that we really end up building what will be perceived as minds. I shall propose some possibilities in the following section. The author even supposes that we will be able to build artificial agents ready to rival humans in cognitive ability (Eliasmith this collection, p. 9). I am convinced that it is not cognitive artificial agents that will be the crucial hurdle, but rather their mindedness. I am also convinced that the huge amount of money spent on certain research projects will most likely result in improved models of the brain, as suggested by Eliasmith (ibid., p. 8), but it is not obvious to me how investing a vast amount of money necessarily results in relevant findings. It is also possible that no real progress will be made. Stating the opposite, which Eliasmith does not, resembles a claim based on expertise as bulletproof evidence. Sure enough, monetary sources are needed to make progress, but they are no guarantee. So possibly technology, biological theories on the brain’s functioning, and money, essentially, might not lead to sophisticated cognitive agents being built (ibid.). The point is not that we should not invest money unless a positive outcome is guaranteed. Rather, we need a theoretical criterion for mindedness that is philosophically convincing—and not only robust, but epistemically unjustified social hallucinations. This theoretical criterion is what we lack.