An understandable reaction to the predictive processing framework (PP) is to think that it is too ambitious (Hohwy this collection). My suggestion in this commentary is the opposite. I will argue that PP can be fruitfully applied to areas of inquiry that have so far received little, if any, attention from the proponents of PP. Perhaps we can extend the explanandum even further than Andy Clark has recommended.
There is a certain rhetorical danger to the position I am urging. One should not oversell one’s case. I hope to avoid this danger by being clear upfront that my goal is not to convince the skeptic of the attraction of PP. I cannot improve on Clark (and others, see below) in that regard. Instead, I investigate the following question: if some version of PP (again, see below) is true, then what are the larger implications for human self-understanding? My answer to this question covers three topics. First I will engage with Clark’s discussion of perceptual processing from sections 1 and 2.1 of his article. There I will sketch how PP’s reversal of the traditional model of perceptual processing may have significant implications for the way in which we understand perceptual content, which is a core issue in the philosophy of psychology. In the second section I will turn to another area of philosophical concern: consciousness. Historically, consciousness research has had a rocky relationship with the sciences of the mind. I hope to point towards the possibility of a rapprochement. In the final section of the commentary, I will quickly touch on some practical matters. If PP is true, then there are important consequences for the way in which we approach topics in education, public policy, and social interaction.
My goal is to indicate possible areas in which Clark’s article (and related themes) might serve as a foundation for future directions of research. My main claims are as follows, numbered according to each section:
PP urges an organism-relative conception of perceptual content.
Historical a priori accounts of the structure of perceptual experience converge with results from PP.
There are a number of areas in which PP can find important practical applications.
Before entering into the specific issues, I should add a note about what I mean by PP. Here I am following the general theoretical framework expressed in Clark’s article as well as in a number of other publications (Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013). The approach has a number of intellectual roots, including Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) and Richard Gregory (1980). The main contemporary expression of PP perhaps owes the most to Karl Friston (2005, 2008, 2010) and his collaborators, also with important developments of the generative model by Geoffrey Hinton (2007). By referring to PP as one general framework, I do not mean to imply that there are no outstanding issues of disagreement or open questions within PP. As Clark indicates, citing Spratling (2013), there are a number of options being developed as to the specific implementation of PP. Also, in the philosophical literature there is an emerging question about whether to understand PP as internalist or externalist regarding the vehicles of mental states (Hohwy 2014)—I take no position either way here, but see footnote 2. Overall, my remarks are motivated by Clark’s exposition of PP, but they should be applicable to other approaches and interpretations as well.