Contents

About this Collection – A Short Introduction to the Open MIND Project
Thomas Metzinger

General Introduction: What Does It Mean to Have an Open Mind?
Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer M. Windt

Target Papers, Commentaries, and Replies

1 Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain: Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints
   Michael L. Anderson

   Carving the Brain at its Joints - A Commentary on Michael L. Anderson
   Axel Kohler

   Functional Attributions and Functional Architecture - A Reply to Axel Kohler
   Michael L. Anderson

2 What a Theory of Knowledge-How Should Explain - A Framework for Practical Knowledge beyond Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism
   Andreas Bartels & Mark May

   The Semantic Reading of Propositionality and Its Relation to Cognitive-Representational Explanations - A Commentary on Andreas Bartels & Mark May
   Ramiro Glauer

   Preparing the Ground for an Empirical Theory of Knowing-How - A Reply to Ramiro Glauer
   Andreas Bartels & Mark May

3 Introspective Insecurity
   Tim Bayne

   “I just knew that!”: Intuitions as Scaffolded or Freestanding Judgements - A Commentary on Tim Bayne
   Maximilian H. Engel

   Introspection and Intuition - A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel
   Tim Bayne

4 Meaning, Context, and Background
   Christian Beyer

   Grasping Meaning - A Commentary on Christian Beyer
   Anita Pacholik-Żuromska
Self-identification, Intersubjectivity, and the Background of Intentionality - A Reply to Anita Pacholik-Zuromska
Christian Beyer

5 The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision
Ned Block

Phenomenal Precision and Some Possible Pitfalls - A Commentary on Ned Block
Sascha Benjamin Fink

Solely Generic Phenomenology – A Reply to Sascha Benjamin Fink
Ned Block

6 Rules: The Basis of Morality... ?
Paul M. Churchland

Applied Metascience of Neuroethics - A Commentary on Paul M. Churchland
Hannes Boelsen

A Skeptical Note on Bibliometrics – A Reply to Hannes Boelsen
Paul M. Churchland

7 Embodied Prediction
Andy Clark

Extending the Explanandum for Predictive Processing - A Commentary on Andy Clark
Michael Madary

Predicting Peace: The End of the Representation Wars - A Reply to Michael Madary
Andy Clark

8 Levels
Carl F. Craver

Mechanistic Emergence: Different Properties, Different Levels, Same Thing! - A Commentary on Carl F. Craver
Denis C. Martin

Mechanisms and Emergence - A Reply to Denis C. Martin
Carl F. Craver

9 Mental States as Emergent Properties: From Walking to Consciousness
Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling

The “Bottom-Up” Approach to Mental Life - A Commentary on Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling
Aaron Gutknecht
The Bottom-Up Approach: Benefits and Limits - A Reply to Aaron Gutknecht
Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling

10 Why and How Does Consciousness Seem the Way it Seems?
Daniel C. Dennett

Qualia Explained Away - A Commentary on Daniel C. Dennett
David H. Baßler

How our Belief in Qualia Evolved, and Why We Care so much - A Reply to David H. Baßler
Daniel C. Dennett

11 The Heterogeneity of Experiential Imagination
Jérôme Dokic & Margherita Arcangeli

Imagination and Experience - A Commentary on Jérôme Dokic & Margherita Arcangeli
Anne-Sophie Brüggen

The Importance of Being Neutral: More on the Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Imagination - A Reply to Anne-Sophie Brüggen
Jérôme Dokic & Margherita Arcangeli

12 On the Eve of Artificial Minds
Chris Eliasmith

Future Games - A Commentary on Chris Eliasmith
Daniela Hill

Mind Games - A Reply to Daniela Hill
Chris Eliasmith

13 Can We Be Epigenetically Proactive?
Kathinka Evers

Should We Be Epigenetically Proactive? - A Commentary on Kathinka Evers
Stephan Schleim

Understanding Epigenetic Proaction - A Reply to Stephan Schleim
Kathinka Evers

14 The Paradigmatic Body: Embodied Simulation, Intersubjectivity, the Bodily Self, and Language
Vittorio Gallese & Valentina Cuccio

Multisensory Spatial Mechanisms of the Bodily Self and Social Cognition - A Commentary on Vittorio Gallese & Valentina Cuccio
Christian Pfeiffer
Embodied Simulation: A Paradigm for the Constitution of Self and Others - A Reply to Christian Pfeiffer
Vittorio Gallese & Valentina Cuccio

15 All the Self We Need
Philip Gerrans

Memory for Prediction Error Minimization: From Depersonalization to the Delusion of Non-Existence - A Commentary on Philip Gerrans
Ying-Tung Lin

Metamisery and Bodily Inexistence - A Reply to Ying-Tung Lin
Philip Gerrans

16 Visual Adaptation to a Remapped Spectrum: Lessons for Enactive Theories of Color Perception and Constancy, the Effect of Color on Aesthetic Judgments, and the Memory Color Effect
Rick Grush, Liberty Jaswal, Justin Knoepfler & Amanda Brovold

What Can Sensorimotor Enactivism Learn from Studies on Phenomenal Adaptation in Atypical Perceptual Conditions? - A Commentary on Rick Grush and Colleagues
Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz

Phenomenology, Methodology, and Advancing the Debate - A Reply to Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz
Rick Grush

17 An Information-Based Approach to Consciousness: Mental State Decoding
John-Dylan Haynes

What’s up with Prefrontal Cortex? - A Commentary on John-Dylan Haynes
Caspar M. Schwiedrzik

Can Synchronization Explain Representational Content? - A Reply to Caspar M. Schwiedrzik
John-Dylan Haynes

18 Beyond Illusions: On the Limitations of Perceiving Relational Properties
Heiko Hecht

The Illusion of the Given and Its Role in Vision Research - A Commentary on Heiko Hecht
Axel Kohler

Manifest Illusions - A Reply to Axel Kohler
Heiko Hecht

19 The Neural Organ Explains the Mind
Jakob Hohwy
From Explanatory Ambition to Explanatory Power - A Commentary on Jakob Hohwy
Dominic L. Harkness

The Diversity of Bayesian Explanation - A Reply to Dominic L. Harkness
Jakob Hohwy

20 Millikan’s Teleosemantics and Communicative Agency
Pierre Jacob

Communicative Agency and *ad hominem* Arguments in Social Epistemology - A Commentary on Pierre Jacob
Marius F. Jung

Assessing a Speaker’s Reliability Falls Short of Providing an Argument - A Reply to
Marius F. Jung
Pierre Jacob

J. Scott Jordan & Brian Day

Thickening Descriptions with Views from Pragmatism and Anthropology - A Commentary on J. Scott Jordan & Brian Day
Saskia K. Nagel

After Naturalism: Wild Systems Theory and the Turn To Holism - A Reply to Saskia K. Nagel
J. Scott Jordan & Brian Day

22 The Crack of Dawn: Perceptual Functions and Neural Mechanisms that Mark the Transition from Unconscious Processing to Conscious Vision
Victor Lamme

Consciousness as Inference in Time - A Commentary on Victor Lamme
Lucia Melloni

Predictive Coding Is Unconscious, so that Consciousness Happens *Now* - A Reply to
Lucia Melloni
Victor Lamme

23 Vestibular Contributions to the Sense of Body, Self, and Others
Bigna Lenggenhager & Christophe Lopez

Perspectival Structure and Vestibular Processing - A Commentary on Bigna Lenggenhager & Christophe Lopez
Adrian Alsmith

Vestibular Sense and Perspectival Experience - A Reply to Adrian Alsmith
Bigna Lenggenhager & Christophe Lopez
24 Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership
Caleb Liang

Are there Counterexamples to the Immunity Principle? Some Restrictions and Clarifications - A Commentary on Caleb Liang
Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung

Can Experiential Ownership Violate the Immunity Principle? - A Reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung
Caleb Liang

25 Mathematical Cognition: A Case of Enculturation
Richard Menary

Enriching the Notion of Enculturation: Cognitive Integration, Predictive Processing, and the Case of Reading Acquisition - A Commentary on Richard Menary
Regina E. Fabry

What? Now. Predictive Coding and Enculturation - A Reply on Regina E. Fabry
Richard Menary

26 Understanding Others: The Person Model Theory
Albert Newen

Multiplicity Needs Coherence – Towards a Unifying Framework for Social Understanding - A Commentary on Albert Newen
Lisa Quadt

Albert Newen

27 Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence
Alva Noë

The Fragile Nature of the Social Mind - A Commentary on Alva Noë
Miriam Kyselo

Beyond Agency - A Reply to Miriam Kyselo
Alva Noë

28 How Does Mind Matter? - Solving the Content Causation Problem
Gerard O’Brien

Anne-Kathrin Koch

Rehabilitating Resemblance Redux - A Reply to Anne-Kathrin Koch
Gerard O’Brien
Conscious Intentions: The Social Creation Myth
Elisabeth Pacherie

Conscious Intentions: Do We Need a Creation Myth? - A Commentary on Elisabeth Pacherie
Andrea R. Dreßing

The Causal Role(s) of Intentions - A Reply to Andrea R. Dreßing
Elisabeth Pacherie

Naturalizing Metaethics
Jesse Prinz

Conceptualizing Metaethics - A Commentary on Prinz
Yann Wilhelm

Should Metaethical Naturalists Abandon de dicto Internalism and Cognitivism? - A Reply to Yann Wilhelm
Jesse Prinz

The Representational Structure of Feelings
Joëlle Proust

The Extension of the Indicator-Function of Feelings - A Commentary on Joëlle Proust
Iuliia Pliushch

Feelings as Evaluative Indicators - A Reply to Iuliia Pliushch
Joëlle Proust

The Avatars in the Machine: Dreaming as a Simulation of Social Reality
Antti Revonsuo, Jarno Tuominen & Katja Valli

The Multifunctionality of Dreaming and the Oblivious Avatar - A Commentary on Antti Revonsuo and Colleagues
Martin Dresler

The Simulation Theories of Dreaming: How to Make Theoretical Progress in Dream Science - A Reply to Martin Dresler
Antti Revonsuo, Jarno Tuominen & Katja Valli

Davidson on Believers: Can Non-Linguistic Creatures Have Propositional Attitudes?
Adina Roskies

Crediting Animals with the Ability to Think: On the Role of Language in Cognition - A Commentary on Adina Roskies
Ulrike Pompe-Alama

Thought, Language, and Inner Speech - A Reply to Ulrike Pompe-Alama
Adina Roskies
Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide: Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience

Jonathan Schooler

Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler
Verena Gottschling

Stepping Back and Adding Perspective - Reply to Gottschling
Jonathan Schooler

The Cybernetic Bayesian Brain: From Interoceptive Inference to Sensorimotor Contingencies
Anil K. Seth

Perceptual Presence in the Kuhnian-Popperian Bayesian Brain - A Commentary on Anil K. Seth
Wanja Wiese

Inference to the Best Prediction - A Reply to Wanja Wiese
Anil K. Seth

The Ongoing Search for the Neuronal Correlate of Consciousness
Wolf Singer

It’s Not Just About the Contents: Searching for a Neural Correlate of a State of Consciousness - A Commentary on Wolf Singer
Valdas Noreika

State or Content of Consciousness? - A Reply to Valdas Noreika
Wolf Singer

Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness
Evan Thompson

Just in Time—Dreamless Sleep Experience as Pure Subjective Temporality - A Commentary on Evan Thompson
Jennifer M. Windt

Steps Toward a Neurophenomenology of Conscious Sleep – A Reply to Jennifer M. Windt
Evan Thompson

What is the State-of-the-Art on Lucid Dreaming? Recent Advances and Questions for Future Research
Ursula Voss & Allan Hobson

Insight—What Is It, Exactly? - A Commentary on Ursula Voss & Allan Hobson
Lana Kühle
Reflections on Insight - A Reply to Lana Kühle
Ursula Voss

39 Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance
Kenneth Williford

Explaining Subjective Character: Representation, Reflexivity, or Integration? - A Commentary on Kenneth Williford
Tobias Schlicht

Individuation, Integration, and the Phenomenological Subject - A Reply to Tobias Schlicht
Kenneth Williford