%0 Book Section %A Liang, Caleb %D 2015 %T Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership %E Metzinger, Thomas K. %E Windt, Jennifer M. %B Open MIND %C Frankfurt am Main %I MIND Group %& 24(T) %! Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership %@ 9783958570030 %R 10.15502/9783958570030 %X In what follows, I investigate the distinction between the sense of self-as-object and the sense of self-as-subject, and propose an account that is different from Shoemaker’s immunity principle. I suggest that this distinction can be elucidated by examining two types of self-experience: the sense of body ownership and the sense of experiential ownership. The former concerns self-as-object: whether a body part or a full body belongs to me. The latter concerns self-as-subject: whether I represent myself as the unique subject of experience. A key point is that misrepresentation can occur not only in the sense of body ownership but also in the sense of experiential ownership. Then I examine the most relevant neuroscientific accounts of the sense of self-as-subject, including Damasio’s account of the core-self, Panksepp’s affective neuroscience, neural synchrony, and the subcortical-cortical midline structures. I argue that none of these successfully explains the neural basis of the sense of self-as-subject. In order to make progress, I suggest, the first step is to look for and then to study the various conditions in which one can pursue the “Wittgenstein Question”. %K Body ownership, Core-self, Experiential ownership, Immunity principle, Neural synchrony, Self-as-object, Self-as-subject %U https://open-mind.net/papers/self-as-subject-and-experiential-ownership %G English