@incollection{Noë.2015, abstract = {In this paper I respond to Kyselo’s (this collection) claim that actionism, and other versions of the enactive embodied approach to mind, fail to accord social relations a constitutive role in making up the human mind. I argue that actionism can meet this challenge—the view makes relations to others central to an account of human experience—but I also question whether the challenge is clear enough. I ask: what exactly does it mean to say that social relations play this sort of constitutive role?}, author={Noë, Alva}, title = {Beyond Agency}, url = {https://open-mind.net/papers/beyond-agency2014a-reply-to-kyselo}, keywords = {Actionism, Body-social problem, Concept pluralism, Concepts, Consciousness, Enactive account, Enactive self, Evans, Fragility, Frege, Individualism, Intellectualism, Kant, Organized activity, Perception, Plato, Presence, Sensorimotor account, Socially enacted autonomy, Socially extended mind​, The intellectualist insight, The intellectualist thesis, Understanding, Wittgenstein}, publisher = {MIND Group}, isbn = {9783958571068}, editor = {Metzinger, Thomas K. and Windt, Jennifer M.}, booktitle = {Open MIND}, chapter = {27(R)}, year = {2015}, address = {Frankfurt am Main}, doi = {10.15502/9783958571068}}