This paper examines the case for pessimism concerning the trustworthiness of introspection. I begin with a brief examination of two arguments for introspective optimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the view that introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I argue that there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls short of its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about why some types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive than others.

Keywords
Cognitive phenomenology | Emotion | Freestanding judgments | Imagery | Introspection | Introspection-reliant | Optimism | Pessimism | Scaffolded judgments | Schwitzgebel

1 Introduction

There is a curious ambivalence in current attitudes towards our epistemic relationship to consciousness. Some theorists hold an optimistic view of the powers of introspection, regarding judgments about one’s current experiences as epistemically secure—perhaps some of the most secure judgments that we make. Optimists rarely claim that we have exhaustive and infallible access to consciousness, but they do hold the epistemic credentials of introspection in high regard, at least when introspection is directed towards the phenomenal character of consciousness. Those inclined to optimism don’t doubt that it is possible to mis-remember or mis-report one’s experiences, but they tend to assume that one has some kind of epistemic access to one’s experiences simply by having them.¹

Running alongside this vein of optimism is a rather more pessimistic strand of thought, according to which the epistemic credentials of introspection are chronically insecure. Far from regarding introspection as a light that illuminates every corner of consciousness, pessimists suspect that significant swathes of experience are accessible to introspection only with great difficulty if at all.²

² The contrast between “optimists” and “pessimists” is far from sharp, for optimists often grant that epistemic access to consciousness can be (very) challenging, and pessimists often allow that there are experiential domains with respect to which introspection is trust-
According to Dan Haybron, “[…] even the gross qualitative character of our conscious experience can elude our introspective capacities” (Haybron 2007, p. 415). Sounding a similar note, Maja Spener has argued that “philosophers and psychologists routinely overestimate the epistemic credentials of introspection in their theorizing” (Spener unpublished; see also Spener 2011a, 2011b, and 2013). But perhaps the most thoroughgoing pessimist is Eric Schwitzgebel:

Most people are poor introspectors of their own ongoing conscious experience. We fail not just in assessing the causes of our mental states or the processes underlying them; and not just in our judgments about nonphenomenal mental states like traits, motives and skills, and not only when we are distracted, or passionate or inattentive or self-deceived, or pathologically deluded or when we’re reflecting about minor matters, or about the past, or only for a moment, or when fine discrimination is required. We are both ignorant and prone to error. There are major lacunae in our self-knowledge that are not easily filled in, and we make gross, enduring mistakes about even the most basic features of our currently ongoing conscious experience (or “phenomenology”), even in favourable circumstances of careful reflection, with distressing regularity. (2008, p. 247)

Although Schwitzgebel’s pessimism is tempered by moments of optimism, the dominant theme in his work is that introspection cannot be trusted to reveal anything other than the most mundane features of consciousness. Descartes, Schwitzgebel argues, “had it quite backwards when he said the mind—including especially current conscious experience—was better known than the outside world” (2008, p. 267).

I feel the pull of both optimism and pessimism. In my optimistic moments I find it hard...
to take seriously the suggestion that I might be guilty of “gross and enduring mistakes” about the basic features of my current phenomenology. But the arguments for pessimism are powerful and not easily dismissed, and I worry that Schwitzgebel is right when he suggests that the allure of optimism might be due to nothing more than the fact that “no-one ever scolds us for getting it wrong” (2008, p. 260).

A central aim of this paper is to provide an overview of Schwitzgebel’s case for introspective pessimism, and to chart a number of ways in which the optimist might respond to it. But although this paper can be read as a defence of a kind of optimism, my central concern is not so much to take sides in this debate as to advance it by noting various complexities that have perhaps been overlooked. But before turning to the debate itself let me make a few comments about its importance. An account of the trustworthiness of introspection is likely to have a bearing on two important issues. Most obviously, it has implications for the use of introspection as a source of evidence regarding philosophical and scientific debates about consciousness. Whether or not introspection is our sole form of access to consciousness, there is no doubt that it is currently treated as a central form of such access, and thus doubts about the reliability of introspection engender doubts about the viability of the study of consciousness. A second issue on which the trustworthiness of introspection has an important bearing concerns debates about the nature of introspection, and in particular the relationship between introspection and consciousness. Some accounts of introspection take a person to be necessarily acquainted with his or her conscious states, where acquaintance is an epistemic relationship of a particularly intimate kind (Gertler 2012; Horgan et al. 2006; Smithies 2012). It is fair to say that such approaches are optimistic by nature, and although advocates of such accounts have attempted to accommodate the possibility of introspective ignorance and error (see e.g., Horgan 2012), the success of such attempts is very much an open question. Other accounts of “introspection”—such as those that deny that there are any distinctively first-personal modes of access to consciousness—can easily accommodate introspective ignorance and error, but they struggle to account for the epistemic security that often seems to characterize introspection. In short, an account of introspection’s epistemic profile would function as a useful constraint on accounts of its nature.

2 Motivating optimism

By “introspection” I mean an immediate judgment that has as its intentional object a current psychological state of one’s own. Introspection can take as its object a wide variety of psychological states, but here I am concerned only with the introspection of phenomenal states—states that there is “something it is like” for the subject in question to be in. In principle one could have any number of reasons for self-ascribing a phenomenal state—for example, it is possible to self-ascribe pain on the basis of neural or behavioural evidence—but introspection involves the self-ascription of phenomenal states on the basis of seemingly “direct” contact with them.3

There are many aspects of consciousness with respect to which we clearly have little to no introspective access. For example, introspection is clearly not a source of information about the neural basis of consciousness or its functional role. But surely, one might think, introspection can provide trustworthy answers to such questions as, “Am I now in a conscious state with such-and-such a phenomenal character?” Roughly speaking, to regard introspection as able to reveal the phenomenal character of one’s conscious states is to have an optimistic attitude towards it. But there is more than one sense in which introspection might be said to reveal the character of consciousness, and thus more than one way to be an introspective optimist.

One way in which introspection can reveal a phenomenal state is by allowing one to discriminate it from its phenomenal neighbours. I take discrimination to be bound up with the ca-

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3 Introspection may involve direct access to consciousness at a personal level and yet also be inferential and indirect at sub-personal levels of description.
pacity to single the state out from amongst the other experiences—e.g., thoughts, perceptual experiences, and bodily sensations—that happen to populate one’s field of consciousness. Discriminative access to an experience allows one to direct one’s attention towards it and to thus make it the potential target of demonstrative thought—“I wish that this experience would stop”. A second mode of introspective access to consciousness involves the deployment of categories. To categorize a phenomenal state is to locate it within a taxonomy of some kind. Categorical access to the experience of an itch, for example, involves recognizing it as a phenomenal state of a certain type—a state, perhaps, that has a certain intensity, bodily location, and relations to other experiences. Categorical access is a more sophisticated form of access than discriminative access. Just as it is possible to discriminate a bird from its surroundings without being able to recognize it as a bird—perhaps all one can do is bring it under the demonstrative, “that thing there in the sky”—so too it may be possible to discriminate a phenomenal state without being able to recognize it as the kind of phenomenal state it is. Mature human beings enjoy some degree of categorical and discriminative access to their phenomenal states, but many conscious creatures—non-linguistic animals and young children, for example—may enjoy only discriminative access to consciousness.4

With this in mind, we can distinguish two forms of introspective optimism. Moderate introspective optimism holds that being in a phenomenal state typically brings with it the capacity to discriminate that state from its phenomenal neighbours, while a more radical form of introspective optimism holds that being in a phenomenal state typically brings with it the capacity to both discriminate and accurately categorize it. By the same token, introspective pessimism can be more or less radical depending on whether its scope is restricted to categorical access (moderate) or includes both categorical and discriminative access (radical). In what follows, I use the terms “introspective optimism” and “introspective pessimism” to refer to the moderate versions of these views unless noted otherwise.

2.1 The phenomenological argument

Although introspective optimism is often assumed rather than explicitly argued for, I think it is possible to discern two lines of argument for it in the literature. Neither argument is conclusive, but taken together they go some way towards justifying the widespread endorsement of introspective optimism.

The first argument is phenomenological: introspection seems to reveal itself as providing a trustworthy source of information about consciousness. In other words, the epistemic security of introspection seems to be something that is manifest in its very phenomenology. Consider Brie Gertler’s description of what it is like to attend to the experience that is generated by pinching oneself:

When I try this, I find it nearly impossible to doubt that my experience has a certain phenomenal quality—the phenomenal quality it epistemically seems to me to have, when I focus my attention on the experience. Since this is so difficult to doubt, my grasp of the relevant aspect of how things epistemically seem to me (this phenomenal property is instantiated) is directly tied to the phenomenal reality that is its truthmaker. (2012, p. 111)

I suspect that Gertler’s comments will strike a chord with many readers—they certainly resonate with me. Introspection seems not merely to

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4 This claim would need to be tempered if as seems plausible discriminative access requires a minimal form of categorical access. Consider again the case of discriminating a bird but failing to recognize it as a bird. This counts as a failure of categorical access insofar as one fails to bring it under the concept <bird> (or related concepts such as <robin>), but it is arguable that in order to discriminate it from its perceptual background one (or one’s visual system) must bind the various visual features together as the features of a single object, which may require a minimal form of categorical access to the object.
provide one with information about one’s experiences, it seems also to “say” something about the quality of that information. This point can be illuminated by contrasting introspection with other forms of access to consciousness. Suppose that you believe that you have the phenomenology associated with anger because a friend has pointed out that you are behaving angrily. In cases like this, testimony provides one with a form of access to one’s phenomenal states, but this access surely lacks the epistemic security that introspective access typically possesses—or at least seems to possess. It would be very odd to put more faith in “third-person” evidence concerning one’s own conscious states than “first-person” evidence.

Now, one might think that even if the phenomenological consideration just surveyed can explain why optimism seems so compelling, it surely can’t provide any justification for it. Appealing to introspection itself in order to establish its epistemic credentials would be as futile as attempting to pull oneself up by one’s own shoelaces. If it’s introspection itself that is in the dock, how could its own testimony exonerate it?

In considering this objection we need to distinguish two questions. One question is whether introspection makes claims about its own veracity. A second question is what to make of such claims should they exist—that is, whether to regard them as providing additional reasons for thinking that introspection is trustworthy. Beginning with the first question, it seems to me not implausible to suppose that introspection could bear witness to its own epistemic credentials. After all, perceptual experience often contains clues about its epistemic status. Vision doesn’t just provide information about the objects and properties present in our immediate environment, it also contains information about the robustness of that information. Sometimes vision presents its take on the world as having only low-grade quality, as when objects are seen as blurry and indistinct or as surrounded by haze and fog. At other times visual experience represents itself as a highly trustworthy source of information about the world, such as when one takes oneself to have a clear and unobstructed view of the objects before one. In short, it seems not implausible to suppose that vision—and perceptual experience more generally—often contains clues about its own evidential value. As far as I can see there is no reason to dismiss the possibility that what holds of visual experience might also hold true of introspection: acts of introspection might contain within themselves information about the degree to which their content ought to be trusted.

The foregoing addresses the first of the two questions identified above but not the second, for nothing in what I have said provides any reason to think that introspection is a reliable witness to its own veracity. It is one thing for introspection to represent its deliverances as trustworthy but it is another for those deliverances to be trustworthy. But this being noted, it seems to me not unreasonable to think that the claims introspection makes on its own behalf should be afforded some degree of warrant. In general, we regard perceptual testimony as innocent unless proven guilty, and even if introspection is not itself a form of perception it seems reasonable to apply that same rule here. (After all, it is not clear why we would have acquired a cognitive capacity if its deployment routinely led us astray.) The phenomenological argument certainly doesn’t provide any kind of proof for introspective optimism, but it seems to me to do more than merely explain why optimism is so attractive: it also provides it with some degree of justification.

2.2 The conceptual argument

A rather different argument for optimism takes as its point of origin the very notion of a phenomenal state. By definition, a phenomenal state is a state that there is “something that it’s like” for the subject in question to be in. Conscious creatures enjoy mental states of many kinds, but it is only phenomenal states that bring with them a subjective perspective. But—so the argument runs—if a phenomenal state is a state that there is something it is like to be in, then the subject of that state must have epistemic access to its phenomenal character. A

state to which the subject had no epistemic access could not make a constitutive contribution to what it was like for that subject to be the subject that it was, and thus it could not qualify as a phenomenal state. Call this the *conceptual argument*.  

How compelling is this argument? It seems to me that a lot depends on what is implied by the notion of “epistemic access”. There is little to recommend the conceptual argument if “epistemic access” is understood in terms of categorization, for it seems fairly clear that a subject need not possess the capacity to accurately categorize its phenomenal states in order for them to contribute to its phenomenal perspective. Of necessity any phenomenal state will fall under categories of various kinds, but the nature of these categories need not be transparent to the creature experiencing it.

But suppose that we construe epistemic access in terms of categorization, rather than identification. Might the conceptual argument justify a moderate form of optimism, according to which subjects must have discriminative access to their phenomenal states? To make this clearer, suppose that it is possible for phenomenal states to occur within the modules of early vision of the kind that are concerned with determining (say) texture or colour constancy. Such phenomenal states—assuming that they are possible—would be completely inaccessible to the subject in question. The creature in question would be unable to contrast the phenomenal character of these states with the phenomenal character of any of its other experiences; it would be unable to single such states out for attention, and it would be unable to make them the objects of demonstrative thought. As such, it seems to me that it is very plausible to hold that they couldn’t be genuinely ascribed to the subject in question, but could at best be ascribed only to one of the subject’s perceptual modules. The root of this intuition, I suspect, lies with the thought that a phenomenal state to which the subject has no discriminative access couldn’t be anything “to” the subject—

that in the relevant sense of the phrase there couldn’t be anything “that it’s like” for the subject to have the relevant experiences.

Although attractive, this argument is not without its problems. One challenge comes in the form of creatures that lack introspective capacities. A creature without introspective capacities might be able to use its conscious states to discriminate some features of the world from others, but it would not be able to make its conscious states themselves objects of its own discriminative activities. And yet—the objection runs—it would be implausible to hold that creatures that lack the capacity for introspective discrimination cannot have phenomenal states. Intuitively, having phenomenal states is one thing and being able to discriminate one’s phenomenal states for each other is another—and more sophisticated—thing. Thus—the argument runs—discriminative access to a phenomenal state cannot be a necessary condition for being in that state.

I certainly agree that it would be implausible to restrict phenomenal states to creatures that possess introspective capacities, but perhaps the objection can be met without making such a restriction. What we can say is that when a creature does acquire introspective capacities those capacities bring with them the ability to discriminate its phenomenal states from one another (at least under epistemically benign conditions). So, we can grant that being in a phenomenal state doesn’t require discriminative access to that state, but also hold that creatures with introspective capacities will be able to discriminate their phenomenal states from one another (again, at least when conditions are epistemically benign).

A second objection to the conceptual argument concerns states that occupy the “margins” of consciousness—such as the unnoticed hum of the refrigerator or the background phenomenology of mood experiences. It is arguable that in some cases experiences like this not only fail to fall within the scope of introspection but in fact cannot be brought within its scope, for to attend to them would be to bring them into the “centre” of consciousness and thus change their phenomenal character. Such states serve as po-

5 There are echoes here of the claim that phenomenal consciousness entails a certain kind of “access consciousness”. For some relevant discussion see Church (1997) and Clark (2000).
tential counter-examples to the claim that creatures with introspective capacities must be able to discriminate their phenomenal states from one another.

In response, one might grant that even if the phenomenal states that occur in the margins of consciousness cannot be singled out for introspective attention, there is still a sense in which they can be the objects of discrimination. Not only can they be discriminated from one another, they can also be discriminated from those phenomenal states that do fall within the scope of attention. Indeed, if such states cannot be discriminated from their phenomenal neighbours in any way then it is unclear what reason we could have for thinking of them as falling within the margins of consciousness at all, rather than being completely unconscious.

Where do these considerations leave us? I have suggested that the phenomenological argument provides some reason to take at least a moderate form of optimism seriously. It doesn’t, of course, establish that our access to all kinds of phenomenal states is robust—indeed, one might even appeal to phenomenological considerations to motivate the idea that our epistemic access to significant regions of phenomenal space is very poor. (I return to this topic shortly.) The conceptual argument provides little reason to think that we will always be able to categorize our phenomenal states, but it does provide some motivation for the idea that being in a phenomenal state brings with it the ability to discriminate that phenomenal state, at least when it comes to creatures with introspective capacities. In short, optimism of at least a moderate form is not merely a holdover from Cartesianism but can be provided with some degree of support. With these considerations in mind let us turn now to the case for pessimism.

3 Motivating pessimism

Two distinctions will prove helpful in what follows. One distinction is between forms of pessimism that concern only our capacity to identify our phenomenal states and forms of pessimism that call into question our capacity to both discriminate and categorize our phenomenal states. A second distinction concerns the scope of pessimism. At one end of the spectrum are local forms of pessimism that concern only a relatively circumscribed range of phenomenal states (say, imagery experiences), while at the other end of the spectrum are forms of pessimism that are unrestricted in scope. Perhaps no theorist has ever embraced a truly global form of pessimism—even Schwitzgebel grants that introspection is trustworthy with respect to certain aspects of consciousness—but some forms of pessimism are clearly wider in scope than others. These two distinctions are, of course, orthogonal to each other. One could be a moderate but global pessimist; alternatively, one could endorse a radical but highly local form of pessimism.

So much for the varieties of pessimism—how might one argue for the view? One influential line of argument for pessimism—or at least something very much like it—appeals to the alleged privacy of introspection. Because an individual’s introspective judgments cannot be checked by anyone else, it follows—that the argument runs—that it would be inappropriate to trust them. This argument is often used to motivate the view that introspection is scientifically illegitimate, but it could also be used to motivate the view that one should adopt a sceptical attitude towards one’s own introspective capacities. Although it has been influential, I will leave this argument to one side in order to focus on a trio of arguments that aim to establish not merely that there is no positive reason to trust introspection (as the argument just outlined attempts to do), but that there is positive reason not to trust it. My presentation of these arguments will draw heavily on Schwitzgebel’s work, for he has done more than any other author to develop and defend them.

But before I examine those arguments, I want to consider the overall structure of

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6 For critical discussion of this argument see Goldman (1997, 2004) and Piccinini (2003, 2011). In my view the most plausible response to it involves denying that introspection is private in the sense required for the argument to go through. I touch briefly on this idea in section 4.

7 Schwitzgebel is clearly attracted to a fairly global form of introspective pessimism, but (to the best of my knowledge) he doesn’t distinguish between discriminative and categorical access, and thus it is unclear whether his version of pessimism is radical or merely moderate. Generally, however, he seems to have something akin to radical scepticism in mind.
Schwitzgebel’s case for global scepticism. As I read him, Schwitzgebel employs a two-step strategy (2008, p. 259). The first step involves attempting to establish a form of local pessimism via one (or more) of the three argumentative strategies to be explored below. The second step involves generalizing from the kinds of phenomenal states that are the targets of local pessimism to phenomenal states in general. The second step is clearly required, for without it we would have no reason to regard introspection in general as “faulty, untrustworthy, and misleading”—“not just possibly mistaken, but massively and pervasively” (Schwitzgebel 2008, p. 259).\footnote{Another reconstruction of Schwitzgebel’s overarching argumentative strategy proceeds as follows. Although the arguments from dumbfounding, dissociation, and variation establish only local forms of introspective pessimism when considered on their own, when taken collectively they provide a good case for a relatively global form of pessimism given that each of the three arguments concerns distinct (albeit, perhaps, overlapping) domains of phenomenology. Thus understood, Schwitzgebel does not need to appeal to a generalization from the “hard cases” to introspection in general. Although this construal provides an alternative route to pessimism, I regard it as less promising than the one outlined in the text—both as a reading of Schwitzgebel’s work and as an argument in its own right.}

I will consider both steps in due course, but the crucial point to note for now is that, considered in the abstract, the second step of the argument looks somewhat suspect (Bayne & Spener 2010). Even if there are hard cases for introspection—that is, cases in which introspective access to phenomenology is insecure—there also easy cases—that is, cases in which introspective access to phenomenology is clearly secure. Indeed, Schwitzgebel himself grants that introspection “may admit obvious cases” and that some aspects of visual experience “are so obvious it would be difficult to go wrong about them” (Schwitzgebel 2008, p. 253). But if that’s the case, then one might well ask why we shouldn’t generalize from those cases rather than from the hard cases on which he focuses. Schwitzgebel complains that to generalize about introspection only on the basis of the easy cases “rigs the game”. That’s true. But it’s equally true that to generalize only on the basis of the hard cases—as Schwitzgebel seems to do—would also rig the game. In fact, it would seem pretty clear that any comprehensive account of the epistemic landscape of introspection must take both the hard and easy cases into consideration. Arguably, generalizing beyond the obviously easy and hard cases requires an account of what makes the hard cases hard and the easy cases easy. Only once we’ve made some progress with that question will we be in a position to make warranted claims about introspective access to consciousness in general. What this suggests is that although there is a formal distinction between the two steps of Schwitzgebel’s argument, the steps are not entirely independent of each other, for the fortunes of the second step rest in part on the case that can be made for the first step. With that thought in mind, let us now turn to the arguments for pessimism.

3.1 The argument from dumbfounding

One line of argument that features prominently in Schwitzgebel’s work is what I call the argument from dumbfounding.\footnote{Following Hohwy (2011), Schwitzgebel (2011) calls this “the argument from uncertainty”.} Arguments of this form involve posing introspective questions that allegedly stump us—questions that we find ourselves unable to answer with any significant degree of confidence. Here’s an example of such an argument:

Reflect on, introspect, your own ongoing emotional experience at this instant. Do you even have any? If you’re in doubt, vividly recall some event that still riles you until you’re sure enough that you’re suffering from renewed emotion. Or maybe your boredom, anxiety, irritation, or whatever in reading this essay is enough. Now let me ask: Is it completely obvious to you what the character of that experience is? Does introspection reveal it to you as clearly as visual observation reveals the presence of the text before your eyes? Can you discern its gross and fine features through introspection as easily and as confidently as you can, through vision, discern the gross and fine features of nearby external objects? Can you trace its spatiality (or non-spatiality), its viscerality or cogitiveness, its involvement with conscious...
imagery, thought, proprioception, or whatever, as sharply and infallibly as you can discern the shape, texture and color of your desk? (Or the difference between 3 and 27?) I cannot, of course, force a particular answer to these questions. I can only invite you to share my intuitive sense of uncertainty. (Schwitzgebel 2008, p. 251)

This argument does not appeal to independent evidence in order to motivate pessimism. Rather, it appeals to first-person considerations: introspection itself seems to suggest that there are aspects of our own conscious experience that elude our grasp. As Schwitzgebel puts it, “it’s not just language that fails us—most of us?—when we confront such questions [...] but introspection itself. [...] in the case of emotion, the very phenomenology itself—the qualitative character of our consciousness—is not entirely evident” (Schwitzgebel 2008, pp. 249–250).

Before examining the force of this argument, let us first consider what kind of pessimism it aims to establish. Does the above passage call into question our capacity to accurately categorize our emotional phenomenology, or is the claim rather that we lack even the capacity to discriminate our emotional experiences from one another and from the rest of our phenomenal states? Although Schwitzgebel’s concern seems to include questions of discriminative access—after all, the passage begins by asking if we can even tell whether or not we have any emotional phenomenology—I take his worries to centre on our capacity to accurately categorize our emotional phenomenology. As I read him, Schwitzgebel’s questions focus on our ability to determine how our emotional experience is structured, both internally and in terms of its relations to phenomenal states of other kinds.

I think that the questions Schwitzgebel raises are difficult to answer. However, it is not clear to me that this fact provides quite as much support for introspective pessimism as Schwitzgebel thinks it does. Lying behind the dumbfounding strategy is the assumption that the questions being posed have determinate answers—that they are appropriate questions to ask. However, I suspect that in an important range of cases this assumption may be unjustified. With respect to the phenomenology of emotion it is natural to assume that the boundaries between the phenomenal states associated with emotion are as clean and sharp as the boundaries between our standard ways of categorizing emotional states. We regard boredom, anxiety, and irritation as distinct emotional states, and we also regard each of these states as associated with distinctive forms of phenomenology. On the basis of these two thoughts we assume that the phenomenal states associated with these categories can themselves be cleanly distinguished from one another. Thus, when one finds oneself at a loss to know whether one is in the phenomenal state associated with boredom, anxiety, or irritation one naturally assumes that the fault lies with one’s introspective capacities. But perhaps the mistake was to assume that the phenomenology of emotion can be cleanly demarcated into states that are uniquely associated with either boredom, anxiety, or irritation. Perhaps the phenomenal states associated with these emotional states overlap and interpenetrate each other. If this were the case, then although there might be certain contexts in which one’s emotional phenomenology is purely that of (say) boredom, there may also be other contexts in which one’s emotional phenomenology involves a complex mix of the phenomenal states associated with boredom, anxiety and irritation. If one were in a context like this, one might be at something of a loss to know just how to categorize one’s emotional state. The only categories that might come to mind would be those associated with the folk psychology of emotion—<boredom>, <anger> and <irritation>—but these categories might fail to cut the phenomenology of emotion at its joints. In other words, emotional phenomenology may pose a particular introspective challenge not because introspection does a poor job of acquainting us with emotional phenomenology, but because the structure of the phenomenology of emotion fails to map onto the structure of our folk categories of emotions in a straightforward manner.

Other versions of the argument from dumbfounding raise a different set of challenges.
for introspective optimism. Consider the question of introspective access to visual imagery. Schwitzgebel asks his readers to form a visual image of the front of his or her house, and to then consider the following questions:

How much of the scene are you able vividly to visualize at once? Can you keep the image of your chimney vividly in mind at the same time you vividly imagine (or “image”) your front door? Or does the image of your chimney fade as your attention shifts to the door? If there is a focal part of your image, how much detail does it have? How stable is it? Suppose that you are not able to image the entire front of your house with equal clarity at once, does your image gradually fade away towards the periphery, or does it do so abruptly? Is there any imagery at all outside the immediate region of focus? If the image fades gradually away toward the periphery, does one lose colours before shapes? Do the peripheral elements of the image have color at all before you think to assign color to them? Do any parts of the image? If some parts of the image have indeterminate colour before a colour is assigned, how is that indeterminacy experienced—as grey?—or is it not experienced at all? If images fade from the centre and it is not a matter of the color fading, what exactly are the half-faded images like? (Schwitzgebel 2002, pp. 38–39)

I think that this line of questioning poses one of the most significant challenges to optimism. Further, it is doubtful whether this challenge can be resisted in the way that the previous version of the dumbfounding challenge can, for these questions don’t seem to rest on any problematic assumptions. Schwitzgebel isn’t assuming that visual imagery must be pictorial in nature, or that it will always be fully detailed and determinate. Rather, one issue that he explicitly puts on the table is whether the phenomenology of visual imagery can be purely “generic” or “gisty”, or whether it must instead always be specific in some way or another.

But perhaps the dumbfounding challenge can be met in another way. As Jakob Hohwy (2011) has noted, one striking feature of visual imagery is its instability:

In the absence of specific goal parameters for simulations there will be much phenomenal variability because in such conditions subjects must themselves make up the purposes for which they imagine things, or engage in ‘simple’ free-wheeling imagery. For example, there is an indefinite number of purposes for which you can imagine the front of your house (walking up to it, standing close by, assessing its shape, its prettiness, flying around it, how the postman sees it, smelling it, repairing it, buying it, selling it etc), each of these purposes will constrain the imagery, and thus the introspected phenomenology, in different ways. This means that subjects probably do have variable phenomenology, and introspectively report so reliably. (2011, p. 279)

Hohwy’s comments are intended to explain the variability in the introspective reports that individuals give, but they also bear on the dumbfounding argument. Perhaps we are not sure how best to describe the phenomenology of imagery because it is so variable. Imagery experiences cannot be pinned down, but are constantly shifting in response to our own imagistic activity. Precisely how much of the scene we vividly visualize “all at once” depends on the goals that constrain the act of visualization. And, as Hohwy suggests, when we have no such goals our imagery may end up “freewheeling”, such that we move from one state to another. Hohwy grounds his analysis in a predictive-coding account of cognition, but his fundamental point is independent of that theoretical framework and should be fairly uncontroversial: imagery surely is more labile than perceptual experience or bodily sensation. No wonder, then, that its phenomenal structure is that much more difficult to articulate.

I have suggested that the optimist has the resources to meet (or at least “problematize”)
two of the leading versions of the dumbfounding argument. But suppose that my responses are found wanting, and that the pessimist is able to show that our introspective access to both emotional and imagery phenomenology is insecure and impoverished. Even so, there would be a further question as to how such a finding would motivate global pessimism. It is certainly true that questions about the nature of certain kinds of experiences (e.g., emotional and imagery experiences) strike us as difficult to answer and may leave us flummoxed, but it is equally true that many introspective questions strike us as easily answered. Indeed, as the quotation from Gertler makes vivid, many of our introspective judgments appear to be accompanied by a sense of epistemic certainty. Why should we generalize from the first set of cases rather than the second? Without an account of why certain introspective questions leave us dumbfounded it is difficult to see why pessimism about a particular range of introspective questions should undermine the epistemic credentials of introspection more generally. So even if the threat posed by dumbfounding arguments were able to establish a form of local pessimism, that threat would appear to be easily quarantined.

3.2 Dissociation arguments

A very different case for introspective pessimism is provided by what I call dissociation arguments. Such arguments appeal to a lack of congruence between a subject’s introspective judgments and their capacity to produce reliable first-order judgments— that is, judgments about the objects and properties in their environment. An example of this kind of argument is provided by Schwitzgebel’s treatment of the so-called “grand illusion” (Noë 2002). Most people, Schwitzgebel claims, hold that a broad swathe of their environment—perhaps thirty or more degrees—is clearly presented within visual experience with its “shapes, colours, textures all sharply defined”. Schwitzgebel argues that we have good reason to regard such claims as false. In making the case for this claim, he appeals to an example first popularized by Dennett (1991):

Draw a card from a normal deck without looking at it. Keeping your eyes fixed on some point in front of you, hold the card at arm’s length just beyond your field of view. Without moving your eyes, slowly rotate the card toward the centre of your visual field. How close to the centre must you bring it before you can determine the colour of the card, its suit, and its value? Most people are quite surprised at the result of this little experiment. They substantially overestimate their visual acuity outside the central, foveal region. When they can’t make out whether it’s a Jack or a Queen though the card is nearly (but only nearly) dead centre, they laugh, they’re astounded, dismayed. (Schwitzgebel 2008, pp. 254–255)

How might we explain the dissociation between subjects’ introspective judgments and their first-order judgments? One explanation is that the subjects’ introspective beliefs are false, and that people wrongly take themselves to have detailed visual phenomenology outside of the focus of attention. This is the explanation that Schwitzgebel endorses. But as Schwitzgebel (2008, p. 255) himself notes, it is possible to explain this dissociation by supposing that individuals are wrong not about which phenomenal states they are in but only about the origin of that state. With respect to the card trick example, the proposal is that subjects do indeed have detailed visual phenomenology outside of the origin of attention, but that this phenomenology derives from background expectation rather than environmental input—that is, it is “illusory”.

Schwitzgebel’s account of the dissociation may have more intuitive appeal than the account I have just outlined, but it is not clear how the data furnished by the dissociation argument allows us to choose between them. However, reasons to favour Schwitzgebel’s account can be gleaned noting that the judgment on which we have focused—“thirty or more degrees of my visual field presents itself to me clearly in experience with its shapes, colours, textures all sharply defined”—is available to

introspection only indirectly. This judgment is not the direct reflection of any one introspective act, but is a belief about the nature of one’s visual experience that one forms by tracking one’s introspective capacities over time. Call such judgments indirectly introspective. Indirectly introspective judgments can be contrasted with directly introspective judgments—that is, judgments of the kind that one makes in the very context of the card trick experiment, such as “I am now experiencing the shape, colour, and texture of this card (which is presented to me slightly off centre) in sharp detail”. We can now see that although there is a dissociation between the first-order judgments that subjects make and their indirect introspective judgments, there is no such dissociation between their first-order judgments and their direct introspective judgments. Subjects in the card-trick experiment don’t report experiencing the shape, colour, and texture of cards that are presented slightly off centre to them “in sharp detail”—rather, they claim to lack sharp and detailed experiences of such objects. Direct introspective judgments clearly have more warrant than indirect judgments, and thus there is good reason to prefer Schwitzgebel’s explanation of the dissociation over the alternative account.

But although we have found reasons to support Schwitzgebel’s analysis of the dissociation, we have seen that these very reasons undermine his pessimistic attitude to introspection in general, for the evidence in favour of Schwitzgebel’s account involves an appeal to introspection. In other words, the pressure that the dissociation argument puts on indirect introspective judgments assumes that direct introspective judgments are trustworthy. The card trick case does indeed cast doubt on the epistemic security of our background beliefs about our own visual experience, but there is no reason to extend such doubts to include our direct introspective judgments; and it is surely direct introspective judgments that are at the heart of debates about the trustworthiness of introspection. (Indeed, indirect introspection judgments are not really a genuine form of introspection at all.)

Let us turn now to the second step of the dissociation argument: the inference from local pessimism to general pessimism. Suppose that we were to find a dissociation between a certain range of introspective judgments and the subject’s capacity to make the corresponding first-order judgments. Suppose, furthermore, that one could show that this dissociation is best explained by assuming that the introspective judgments in question were false. Would one have any reason to think that introspection in general ought to be regarded with suspicion? Not as far as I can see. It seems to me that our faith in the robustness of introspective access to domains in which such dissociations are not to be found ought to remain completely untroubled by such a finding. In fact, one might even argue that coherence between first-order judgments and (direct) introspective judgments would provide evidence in favour of introspective optimism. If dissociations between a person’s introspective capacities and their first-order capacities can disconfirm their introspective judgments (as the dissociation argument assumes), then associations between a person’s introspective judgments and their first-order capacities ought to confirm them (Bayne & Spener 2010). In other words, the fact that a person’s introspective judgments cohere with their capacity to produce reliable reports of their environment ought to provide us with positive reason to trust those judgments. And a great number of our introspective reports clearly do cohere with our first-order capacities. Although there are cases in which such coherence fails to obtain—for example, Schwitzgebel (2011, Ch. 3) provides a plausible case for the claim that introspective reports of visual imagery are only weakly correlated with the kinds of first-order cognitive capacities that one would expect visual imagery to subserv—such cases...
are striking precisely because they stand out against the backdrop of coherence that characterizes the relationship between our normal introspective reports and our first-order perceptual capacities.

3.3 Arguments from introspective variation

Perhaps the strongest case for introspective pessimism derives from the phenomenon of introspective variation. Such arguments have as their starting point a disagreement about how best to describe some aspect of phenomenology. Pessimists then argue that the best explanation for the introspective dispute is that at least one of the two sides is guilty of a phenomenon. It is tempting to conclude that those who adopt a liberal conception of consciousness as limited to sensory aspects of the mind. On the other side of this dispute are those who deny that conscious thought has a distinctive phenomenal character. Those who hold this view typically allow that conscious thought has a phenomenology of some kind, but they regard that phenomenology as purely sensory—as limited to the phenomenology of inner speech, visual imagery, and so on. We might call this the conservative account of conscious thought for it treats phenomenal consciousness as limited to sensory aspects of the mind. On the other side of this dispute are those who adopt a liberal conception of conscious thought, according to which conscious thought is characterized by a range of non-sensory phenomenal states—states of “cognitive phenomenology”. It is tempting to conclude that at least one of these two sides is guilty of a fairly radical introspective error: introspection either fails to inform conservatives of a wide range of phenomenal states that they enjoy on a regular basis, or it misleads liberals into thinking that they enjoy a wide range of phenomenal states that they don’t enjoy. Either way, introspection would seem to be untrustworthy with respect to what is clearly a central feature of phenomenology.

But before we follow Schwitzgebel (and many others) in embracing this conclusion, we need to consider alternative explanations of the cognitive phenomenology dispute. One possible explanation appeals to group differences in phenomenology. Perhaps the descriptions of conscious thought that both liberals and conservatives give are right when applied to themselves but wrong when taken to describe conscious thought in general. In other words, perhaps both parties to the dispute are guilty of over-hasty generalization rather than introspective error.

Although an appeal to group differences might explain (away) some instances of introspective disagreement, it is unlikely to provide the best explanation of the cognitive phenomenology dispute. First, this account requires a degree of variation in phenomenology for which there are few (if any) parallels. This is not to say that phenomenal differences between individuals might not run much deeper than common-sense tends to assume—consider, for example, the phenomenal differences that characterize synaesthesia (Robertson & Sagiv 2005)—but the kinds of phenomenal differences that we already recognize are nowhere near as fundamental as the kinds of differences required by this explanation of the cognitive phenomenology debate, for liberals claim that conscious thought is characterized by a su generis kind of phenomenology—a kind that is non-sensory in nature. Second, the group difference proposal predicts that there are cognitive and behavioural differences between the advocates of cognitive phenomenology and their detractors that simply don’t appear to obtain. In sum, it seems that the “expansionist” (Prinz 2011) or “exclusivist” (Siewert 2011) view, while the liberal view is also known as the “expansionist” (Prinz 2011) or “inclusivist” (Siewert 2011) view.

11 Other examples of recent introspective disagreement concern the apparent shape of the objects of visual experience (e.g., Siewert 2007; Schwitzgebel 2011, Ch. 2), the existence of high-level perceptual phenomenology (Siegel 2006; Bayne 2009), and the satisfaction conditions of the phenomenology of free will (e.g., Horgan 2012; Nahmias et al. 2004).

12 The conservative view is also known as the “restrictive” (Prinz 2011) or “exclusive” (Siewert 2011) view, while the liberal view is also known as the “expansionist” (Prinz 2011) or “inclusivist” (Siewert 2011) view.
highly unlikely that the debate about the existence of cognitive phenomenology can be explained by supposing that what it is like to be a liberal is different from what it is like to be a conservative.

But there is another deflationary explanation of the debate about cognitive phenomenology that cannot be so easily dismissed. Perhaps the parties to the debate are operating with very different conceptions of what it would take for thought to possess distinctive phenomenal character, and are thus talking past each other (Bayne unpublished). On this proposal, liberals are willing to extend the notion of phenomenal consciousness beyond its sensory paradigms in a way that conservatives are not. If this account is right, then the dispute surrounding the existence of cognitive phenomenology is largely verbal. Rather than disagreeing about what introspection reveals, the two sides instead disagree about how the term “phenomenal consciousness” and its cognates ought to be employed.

Why take this proposal seriously? Well, one argument for it is that it would provide a good explanation of why there is such widespread disagreement about the nature of conscious thought—the very terms in which the debate are couched are contested. It is also widely acknowledged that there are different notions of “what it’s likeness” (see e.g., Tye 1996; Flanagan 1992; Georgalis 2005). Although this proposal clearly needs much more defence and development than I can give it here, I think it is not unreasonable to suppose that the disagreement surrounding the existence of cognitive phenomenology might turn out to be largely verbal. At any rate, it seems to me that this account provides at least as good an explanation of the dispute as that which is required by the argument from variation.\footnote{Of course, the pessimist might argue that, even if the disagreement surrounding the phenomenology of thought is fundamentally semantic, it doesn’t follow that the optimist is off the hook. After all, using introspection to ground a science of consciousness doesn’t merely require the reliability of introspection, it also requires intersubjective agreement about its deliverances. And— the pessimist might continue—dispute about how to apply the term “phenomenal consciousness” and its cognates threatens to undermine intersubjective disagreement about what introspection reveals just as surely as introspective unreliability does. This is a fair challenge, but in my view the prospects for securing a solution to the cognitive phenomenology dispute, should it turn out to be fundamentally semantic, are quite high. For further discussion of phenomenal disputes and introspective disagreement see Hohwy (2011) and Siewert (2007).}

There are, of course, other introspective disagreements besides that concerning the phenomenology of thought, and nothing that I have said here goes any way towards showing that they too succumb to a deflationary analysis. Indeed, I suspect that certain introspective disputes—for example, those relating to the richness of visual imagery—may well be best explained by appeal to introspective error. But even if the argument from variation succeeds in establishing a local form of pessimism, it seems to me there is little reason to think that this pessimism generalizes. Indeed, domains that feature disagreement in introspective reports stand out against a general backdrop of introspective agreement. Arguably many domains of consciousness exhibit a great deal of uniformity with respect to introspective reports once individual differences and verbal disputes are taken into account. Now, although inter-subjective agreement doesn’t entail that the individuals in question are right, it does need to be explained, and it seems plausible to suppose that leading explanations of inter-subjective agreement will appeal to the trustworthiness of introspection.

4 Elusive phenomenology

In the previous section I argued that there are good reasons for resisting Schwitzgebel’s case for global pessimism. However, we also saw that there are domains in which our introspective access to phenomenal consciousness is rather less secure than we might have pre-theoretically assumed. In other words, we saw that there is reason to think that certain kinds of phenomenal states are introspectively elusive. In this final section I want to sketch an account of why certain types of phenomenal states are elusive and others are not.

Let me begin by distinguishing the form of phenomenal elusiveness with which I am concerned from another notion of phenomenal elusiveness that I want to set to one side. In a recent paper, Kriegel uses the label “elusive ph
nomenology” to describe phenomenal states “whose very essence requires the absence of introspective attention” (2013, p. 1171). Among the examples that he gives of elusive phenomenology are the phenomenal states that occur at the fringes or margins of consciousness. As Kriegel notes, such states are elusive in that any attempt to make them the object of attentive introspection would change their nature. Although Kriegel’s notion of elusiveness is closely related to the one that I employ here, the two notions are not identical. (One way of seeing that they are distinct is that Kriegel’s elusiveness is primarily a matter of the phenomenology, whereas my elusiveness is a matter of one’s introspective access to the phenomenology.) Unlike Kriegel, I am interested in a type of elusiveness that is independent of attention. Consider again visual imagery. Although particular instances of visual imagery might be elusive in Kriegel’s sense because they happen to occupy the margins of consciousness, I am interested here in the fact that visual imagery as such appears to be introspectively elusive.14

Why might certain types of phenomenal states be elusive in a way that other types of phenomenal states are not? Broadly speaking, there are two places in which we might look for an answer to this question. On the one hand we might appeal to intrinsic features of the phenomenal states themselves. Perhaps there is something inherent in the very nature of certain kinds of phenomenal states that renders them relatively opaque to introspective access. Another possibility is that the elusiveness of certain types of phenomenal states has nothing to do with their intrinsic nature but instead reflects the structure of our introspective capacities. Just as our perceptual system is geared toward the identification of certain kinds of environmental states rather than others, so too it is possible that our introspective system is geared towards the identification of certain kinds of phenomenal states rather than others. On this view, the fact that our introspective access to some types of phenomenology is more secure than it is to others tells us more about introspection than it tells us about phenomenal consciousness (as it were).

It is, I think, premature to speculate which of these two accounts might be the more plausible; indeed, it is possible that a full explanation of elusiveness will have to draw on both ideas. But rather than pursue that thought, I want instead to sketch one way in which the structural features of introspection might go some way towards explaining why certain types of introspective judgments are more secure than others. The account in question appeals to a distinction between two kinds of introspective judgments: scaffolded judgments and freestanding judgments (Bayne & Spener 2010). The distinction is perhaps best grasped by means of examples. Contrast an introspective judgment that is directed towards one’s visual experience of seeing a red tomato with an introspective judgment that is directed towards an experience of visual imagery involving a red tomato in front of one. In the former case, there is a perceptual judgment that one is disposed to make (“There is a red tomato in front of me”) whose content corresponds (broadly speaking) to the content of one’s introspective judgment (“I have an experience as of a red tomato in front of me”). In the latter case, however, there is no such first-order judgment that one is disposed to make whose content might correspond to the content of one’s introspective judgment. In a sense, the former judgment is “scaffolded” by a perceptual disposition in a way that the latter judgment is not.

I suggest that scaffolded judgments are typically more secure than freestanding ones precisely because they are scaffolded. At the very least, it is a striking fact that many of the most epistemically insecure introspective judgments appear to be freestanding. Further, one can tell an attractive story about why introspective scaffolding might contribute to epistemic security. In making scaffolded judgments, the subject is able to both exploit the resources that it has for making freestanding judgments and calibrate those resources by drawing on its dispositions to make first-order

14 Phenomenal domains that are at least somewhat elusive include the phenomenology of agency (Metzinger 2006; Bayne 2008; Horgan et al. 2006) and high-level perceptual phenomenology (Siegel 2006; Bayne 2009).
perceptual judgments.\textsuperscript{15} Just as beliefs that are derived from multiple (independent) sources are typically more secure than beliefs derived from just a single source, so too scaffolded introspective judgments might typically be more secure than their freestanding brethren.

5 Conclusion

This paper provides a partial response to Schwitzgebel’s case for global pessimism with respect to introspection. I began by outlining two arguments for optimism; the first argument turned on an appeal to the phenomenology of introspection, while the second drew on a conceptual connection between the notions of introspective access and phenomenality. Neither argument comes close to being decisive, but taken together they provide some explanation for—and justification of—the widespread appeal of optimism. I then turned to a detailed examination of Schwitzgebel’s case for pessimism, arguing that although his arguments go some way towards justifying local pessimism (particularly with respect to imagery), there is little reason to generalize that pessimistic attitude to introspection more generally.

But perhaps the central lesson of this paper is that the epistemic landscape of introspection is far from flat but contains peaks of security alongside troughs of insecurity. Rather than asking whether or not introspective access to the phenomenal character of consciousness is trustworthy, we should perhaps focus on the task of identifying how secure our introspective access to various kinds of phenomenal states is, and why our access to some kinds of phenomenal states appears to be more secure than our access to other kinds of phenomenal states. I have suggested that the notion of introspective scaffolding might play a role in answering this second question, but that that proposal is at best only a very small part of a much larger account of introspective insecurity. There is certainly a lot more work to be done before we have a good grip on the epistemic structure of introspection.

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\textsuperscript{15} An influential account of introspection holds that introspection involves a semantic ascent routine in which one redeployes rather than represents one’s introspective target (Byrne 2005; Evans 1982; Fernández 2013). Although I am not endorsing this account of introspection in general (or indeed of introspective access to perceptual phenomenology in particular), I am suggesting that such procedures might be implicated in introspective access to certain kinds of phenomenal states.
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"I just knew that!": Intuitions as Scaffolded or Freestanding Judgements

Maximilian H. Engel

How reliable are intuitive or introspective judgments? This question has produced lively debates in two respective discussions. In this commentary I will try to show that the two phenomena of introspective and intuitive judgments are very closely related, so that the two separate philosophical debates about them can substantially inform each other. In particular, the intuition debate can profit from conceptual tools that have already been introduced to discussions about the reliability of introspection. Especially the distinction between scaffolded and freestanding judgments, which has been developed by Tim Bayne & Maja Spener (2010), can be used to more carefully investigate intuitions with respect to their epistemic reliability. After briefly applying this framework to some paradigm cases of "philosophically interesting" intuitions, I will come to the conclusion that most of these must be regarded as freestanding judgments and thus cannot play the role of reliable sources of evidence that they are supposed to play in some discussions in contemporary epistemology and methodology.

Keywords
Epistemic reliability | Experimental philosophy | Global pessimism | Local pessimism | Phenomenology of certainty | Philosophical intuitions | Scaffolded vs. freestanding judgments | Thought experiments

1 Introduction

What is the evidential status of introspective mental states? Can they be used as a source of knowledge like other classical candidates, e.g. experimental data, induction, or visual perception? Over the last few decades these questions have been addressed in philosophy of mind and epistemology in particular.1 While on the one hand optimists consider the wide-ranging use of introspection in philosophical debates unproblematic, pessimists on the other hand are very skeptical about the same subject matter. But how far can their skepticism go? Is it really the case that introspective insights are not only sometimes misleading, but generally false? These are the questions underpinning Tim Bayne’s article “Introspective Insecurity”. Here Bayne argues that a total dismissal of introspection as a tool for gaining information about...
one’s own conscious states (global pessimism) would not only be tremendously hard to imagine, but is also not warranted by the arguments raised in favour of that position. What these pessimistic arguments show, however, is that not all kinds of introspection can be used without thorough examination of their truth-tracking capacities. The resulting milder form of skepticism is what Bayne calls local pessimism. This distinction is what I consider Bayne’s most important contribution to the introspection debate, because it helps to avoid an overhasty dismissal of a source of information that is used widely, not only in theorizing, but also in everyday life. He points out that what the global skeptic is missing is the idea that there are different kinds of introspective judgments, where not all are equally insecure. To distinguish between more secure cases of introspection and less secure ones, Bayne emphasizes a distinction introduced by him and his colleague Maja Spener in their paper Introspective Humility (2010), namely that of scaffolded versus freestanding judgments. While scaffolded judgments about one’s introspective states are quite reliable, because their contents match closely with the contents of the non-introspective processes at work (e.g., visual experience), freestanding judgments lack this sort of reliability due to their abstract character. Simply put, the contents of freestanding judgments lack the close connection to what one wants to find out about the world or one’s own mental states.

Another prominent, but also controversial candidate for being an epistemically useful source of evidence is intuition. Much like in the case of introspection, there is a large debate about the reliability and usefulness of intuitions in philosophical theorizing. This debate not only concerns epistemology and philosophy of mind, but also methodology, since many people claim that what philosophy does at its core is conceptual work on the basis of our rational (or conceptual) intuitions (Bealer 1997; Goldman 2007). In the last few years, however, this idea of how to do philosophy has been harshly criticized from many different perspectives. While proponents of the fairly new project called experimental philosophy have tried to investigate the reliability of intuitions by conducting survey studies collecting lay intuitions (Weinberg et al. 2008; Knobe 2007), others have even gone so far as to argue that we do not use any intuitions at all in philosophical theorizing (Cappelen 2012). In any case, it is still open to debate whether intuitions can be used as reliable sources of evidence or not. Here I will first argue that this debate can be substantially informed by Bayne and Spener’s idea of scaffolded versus freestanding judgments; this will be referred to as the Scaffolded vs. Freestanding Intuitions Thesis (SFTI). I will try to show that this is the case by highlighting some close connections and similarities between intuitions and introspection. Second, I will argue that in fact intuitions are often made accessible to the debates by introspection, namely in form of introspective insight about one’s own private concepts. This will be called the Introspection of Private Concepts View (IPCV). Thereafter I will make my third claim, namely that many intuitions, at least those relevant in the debates in epistemology and methodology, are best regarded as freestanding judgments and thus should not count as reliable sources of evidence in philosophical debates. This third and last claim will be what I call the Unreliable Freestanding Intuitions Thesis (UFIT). As in the case of introspection, a total dismissal of intuitions is not (yet) warranted, but neither is their wide-ranging use in contemporary methodology. By applying Bayne’s framework, i.e., the distinction between scaffolded vs. freestanding judgments, to the phenomenon of intuitive judgments, I will try to use this new conceptual tool to find a possible answer to the question of which kinds of intuitions are trustworthy and which should not be considered as reliable in philosophical debates.

2 Some connections and similarities between intuition and introspection

If one takes a look at the literature on introspection, one can find many metaphors that are derived from visual perception, i.e. that describe

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the phenomenon as a sort of peering into one’s own consciousness,3 as well as direct comparisons with visual perception, i.e., stating that the evidential status of introspection is or should be on a par with seeing the outside world. For example, in his depiction of the central idea behind optimism towards introspection, Bayne says that:

Roughly speaking, to regard introspection as able to reveal the phenomenal character of one’s conscious states is to have an optimistic attitude towards it. (Bayne this collection, my italics)

Or take Schwitzgebel, who, in his arguments against the accuracy of introspection, assesses the phenomenon by the standards of visual perception:

Does introspection reveal it to you as clearly as visual observation reveals the presence of the text before your eyes? Can you discern its gross and fine features through introspection as easily and confidently as you can, through vision, discern the gross and fine features of nearby external objects? (2008, my italics)

If one compares this to intuitions, one can see that they are treated in almost the same way. Here, the most prominent historical root of this equal treatment of not only intuitions and perception, but also intuitions and introspection, might be the work of John Locke, who at the beginning of the fourth book of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding states that all knowledge is at its core introspective and intuitive and can thus be regarded as the perception of agreement or disagreement between two ideas:

Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists.

Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge. (1975, p. 525, italics in the original)

But contemporary discussions concerning intuitions also suggest a similarity to perception. Take for example this short description by Ernest Sosa:

Intuition gives us direct insight into the general and abstract. (1998; my italics)4

For George Bealer, who is maybe the most radical proponent of an intuition-based philosophical methodology, the two phenomena are so closely related that he mentions them both as equal sources of evidence in philosophical theorizing:

So in this terminology, the standard justificatory procedure counts as evidence, not only experiences, observations, and testimony, but also intuitions. [...] When one has an intuition, however, often one is introspectively aware that one is having that intuition. On such an occasion, one would then have a bit of introspective evidence as well, namely, that one is having that intuition. (1997, my italics)

This similarity in the way of speaking about the two phenomena and their obvious entanglement in the debate about what counts as evidence5 gives us information about the explananda themselves. Both intuition and introspection can be consciously experienced by the subject that uses them to make a judgement.6 Furthermore, they are judged to be epistemically unproblematic, because the subject has direct access to them.

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3 A further hint at the equal treatment of introspection is the Latin origin of the term ‘introspicere’, which can be translated as ‘to examine’ or ‘to look into’.

4 Here again the Latin origin ‘intueri’, which can be translated as ‘to view’ or also as ‘to examine’, underlines not only the folk psychological connection between intuition and perception but also the similarity between introspection and intuition.

5 For a general discussion of what counts, or should count as evidence, see Williamson (2007).

6 This does not mean that one always deliberately introspects or intu- its. This would be trivially false (Sosa 1998). What is meant is that one can in principle guide one’s attention to the relevant mental state if necessary.
A good example is a classical Gettier-style intuition, such as “It simply seems to me that the person in that scenario does know that she is getting the job” (Gettier 1963). Not only the immediate reaction to Gettier cases, but also the way in which Gettier’s conclusion (i.e. that his thought experiments show that justified true belief does not sufficiently describe knowledge) were widely accepted among philosophers indicates that intuitive judgements are treated as unproblematic and reliable. The same holds for introspective judgements that do not only occur in philosophical debates but also in everyday-life belief formation. An example of such a belief could be expressed by a sentence like: “I surely can’t be mistaken in believing that I am consciously experiencing a red object in front of me at this very moment.” In the same way as in the case of intuitions, the results of introspection do not seem to require further questioning. In short, the act of introspecting something and the act of intuiting something both have a phenomenal aspect that makes them appear epistemically secure. In the course of this commentary this aspect will be referred to as a phenomenology of certainty.7 In fact, I would say that this phenomenal aspect is the reason why the introspection as well as the intuition debate are as controversial as they are. Both phenomena come at first glance with a seeming of epistemic security (or even infallibility), and only after close examination are some insecurities revealed. This phenomenology of certainty, however, does not immediately show that intuitions and introspection inform a subject securely about the truth of a matter. My introspective judgment about the what-it-is-likeness of understanding a sentence in a foreign language or my intuitive judgment about whether a person has knowledge or not are always in need of further justification. It would be a very hasty step to go from the phenomenology of certainty to full-fledged certainty (Metzinger & Windt 2014).

So then what can the two phenomena inform a subject about? The least controversial description of what introspective states are would be along the lines of (Schwitzgebel’s description:

A word about ‘introspection’. I happen to regard it as a species of attention to currently ongoing conscious experience, but I won’t defend that view here. The project at hand stands or falls quite independently. Think of introspection as you will—as long as it is the primary method by which we normally reach judgments about our experience in cases of the sort I’ll describe.8 (2008)

Thus construed, introspection mainly informs a subject about the qualitative aspects of her experience. Simply put, what we do when we introspect is to pay attention to the what-it-is-likeness of our experience.9 This aspect of experience, however, is extremely subjective and private. It is (if even possible) not easy to arrive at scientifically informative generalizations10 from such subjective data.11 What is needed to secure information of that kind is the right kind of embeddedness in other, more secure ways of gaining knowledge about a subject matter. Such judgments about a subject’s experience are what Bayne and Spener, at least by the way I understand them, refer to as scaffolded judgments (2010; Bayne this collection). For ex-

7 It is important to notice that the “phenomenology of certainty” presupposes a “phenomenology of knowing”. This is best regarded as the “phenomenology of knowing that one knows”. For my purposes here the “phenomenology of knowing”, though important, is not the interesting phenomenal aspect of intuitions or introspective insights. I hold the “phenomenology of certainty” far more interesting, because I think that it is that phenomenology that leads to the strong sense of infallibility of intuitive, as well as introspective judgments.

8 The cases he describes in that paper are from the same domains of experience that Bayne discusses in his article for this volume namely emotion, visual perception, and cognitive phenomenology.

9 Note that due to restrictions of space I will cover only, the most relevant interpretation of introspection, which can be described as a sort of inward perception. The word “perception” here is to be read in a metaphorical way. It is not meant to express a commitment to something along the lines of a higher-order perception view on introspection (Grüzelbère 1995). Rather this inward “perception” can be understood as kind metacognition that helps a subject to conceptualize her own experiences. For a more detailed distinction between different kinds and qualities of introspection, see Metzinger (2003, p. 35).

10 Though this might not be a problem for relying on introspection in the case of perception, it becomes more pressing when it comes to using introspective data to inform epistemology or methodology.

11 A further methodological problem that needs to be taken into consideration is the fact that when collecting data about introspective or intuitive states one has to rely on a subject’s report about the relevant mental state. This can be a possible source of contamination, which makes an investigation of the phenomena even more difficult (Cummins 1998).
ample, my introspective judgment about my red experience is not exhaustively justified by itself, but by the close match of the content of my introspective state and the non-phenomenal aspects of my visual observation. Only then can introspection play an evidential role, and thus contribute to knowledge about one’s own conscious states. But what if there is no such match? If introspection is concerned with more abstract contents, like, for example, the basic structures of intentionality or thought in general, the lack of embeddedness at least increases the insecurity of the judgment and thus makes it an unreliable source of knowledge. Judgments of that kind, again following Bayne and Spencer, are called freestanding judgments.

Let us now turn to intuitions. What are intuitions about? First of all, it is important to say that not all kinds of intuitions are relevant to philosophical debates. Cases of intuitive controls on a smartphone, for example, are not at the core of the debate. What is meant by philosophically interesting intuitions can be most appropriately expressed by the term conceptual intuition. In short, intuitions in a philosophically relevant sense are judgments that are shaped by the concepts a person has of some subject matter or phenomenon. Usually those intuitions are tested by conducting thought experiments in which a case is described that should (or should not) fulfill all necessary and sufficient conditions of a concept. Then one is supposed to take that very concept and check if it applies to the case (or not). This is why Alvin Goldman also refers to philosophical intuitions as “application intuitions” (2007). Probably the most prominent examples of such intuition-testing thought experiments are Gettier cases. Going back to Edmund Gettier’s famous paper, Gettier cases describe scenarios in which a person appears to lack knowledge, despite the fact that the classical conditions for having knowledge, namely, having a justified true belief, are met (1963). But can these conceptual intuitions in fact inform us about what knowledge is in general, or do those cases simply inform us about our personal concepts? Findings from the fairly new field of experimental philosophy, though highly controversial (Cullen 2010), indicate that conceptual intuitions that have been treated as general intuitions, like those in Gettier cases, are in fact highly idiosyncratic, and thus it is still an open question whether they can lead to generalizations about the concept at hand (Alexander 2012). In other words, one could argue that conceptual intuitions are the reflections of a subject’s idiosyncratic history of concept acquisition (Bieri 2007).

So intuitions—or more precisely their contents—reflect upon a person’s individual, highly subjective concepts. Just like in the case of introspection (which has been shown to be very subjective as well), we need to investigate whether it is possible to move from those personal concepts to general claims about their contents in a reliable way.

I take all of the above-mentioned similarities between introspection and intuition to be sufficient for investigating the reliability of intuitions with conceptual tools and insights that have already been introduced and established to the introspection debate. Thus, I will in the next section try to clarify what counts as an epistemically reliable intuition by applying the distinction between scaffolded and freestanding judgments from the introspection debate to intuitions. In other words, I will investigate intuitions as scaffolded vs. freestanding intuitions (SFIT).

SFIT =_{Df} Due to the similarities between introspection and intuition, one can also distinguish between scaffolded and freestanding intuitions.

3 Philosophical intuitions as freestanding judgments

Before we examine whether philosophical intuitions are best understood as scaffolded or freestanding judgments, it will be helpful to

12 Even if this role is then obviously a minor one in forming a belief about the world.

13 In addition to these findings, it is also an advantage of treating intuitions as reflections on personal concepts, because such a view is likely to be naturalized (Goldman 2007). Arguments from obscurity or empirical implausibility of the type that have been raised against other construals of intuition, such as Platonic insights into the laws of nature (Brendel 2004), can thus be avoided.
take a closer look at how intuitions are treated in philosophical theorizing. For this we go back again to the paradigm case of intuition-based philosophy: Gettier (1963) cases. The expected (and therefore long unchallenged) outcome of those thought experiments is that the person reflecting on the cases admits that they describe instances of justified true belief that at the same time fail to count as knowledge. How do we know they’re not knowledge? We just know! Reflecting on that answer one can come to the conclusion that one has an intuition about the concept of knowledge. The next question that then needs to be answered is how a person arrives at that conclusion. I claim that this is done by introspection. As described above, introspection is best understood as the act of paying attention to one’s conscious states of experience, or in other words about the phenomenal aspects of experience. In the case of an intuition, this phenomenal aspect would be the above-mentioned phenomenology of certainty. To summarize this, conceptual intuitions are reflected upon by introspecting on one’s own concepts and their applicability conditions. This practice is what I call the Introspection of Personal Concepts View of Intuitions (IPCV).

\[ \text{IPCV} \Rightarrow \text{Conceptual Intuitions are made accessible by introspecting one’s own phenomenology of certainty towards the applicability of a certain concept.} \]

Following IPCV, this practice is then of course vulnerable to the same skeptical challenges that have been raised against introspection in general. How accurately can I introspect what constitutes my concept of knowledge? What about modal aspects like the necessity of a proposition? These questions can be made more accessible by thinking about intuitions in terms of scaffolded or freestanding judgments.

Again taking the Gettier intuition about knowledge, what makes this intuition, even though not universal, so astonishingly stable among Western philosophers? I argue that this is due to the close match between the content of the intuition (i.e. “She doesn’t know!”) and the rules that one learns about how to successfully use the concept of knowledge in our cultural niche (i.e.: “Only ascribe knowledge if a person is justified in the right way to believe a proposition!”). So in the context of Western philosophy, the intuitive judgment can be regarded as a scaffolded and thus reliable judgment. It is reliable because it is embedded in our conventional, everyday use of the word “knowledge". But what about knowledge in general, i.e., outside the context of Western culture? In that case, the content of the intuition, due to its personal character, would not match the context-free, abstract use of the concept of knowledge. The judgment would be a freestanding judgment and thus an unreliable source of evidence for making general claims about knowledge. This would perfectly fit the idea of intuitions as individually-acquired concepts and also explain findings from experimental philosophy, which indicate that intuitions are highly variable among different cultures (Weinberg et al. 2008). One could now argue that, even if I am correct about conceptual intuitions like those in Gettier cases, there are basic intuitions that are reliable. A candidate for such an intuition is presented by Bealer in the form of rational intuitions:

By contrast, when we have a rational intuition—say, if \( P \) then not not \( P \)—it presents itself as necessary: it does not seem to us that things could be otherwise; it must be that if \( P \) then not not \( P \). (I am unsure how exactly to analyze what is meant by saying that a rational intuition presents itself as necessary. Perhaps something like this: necessarily, if \( x \) intuits that \( P \), it seems to \( x \) that \( P \) and also that necessarily \( P \) [...] ) (1997)

The reliability of such a basic intuition can also be accommodated in the terminology of scaffolded and freestanding judgments. Due to the close match between our intuition and the way

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14 Surely this is a very simplified and rough description of concept acquisition. Further details should be empirically investigated, but due to limited space, and for and the purposes of my argument, this must suffice.

15 The scaffold here would be the proper use of a word or concept in its respective culture or context. Further, notice that it is also possible to have several types of scaffolding at the same time, like conceptual expertise (i.e. cases in which a person has a significant amount of background knowledge about special concept) plus the above-mentioned cultural scaffolding. For a defence of conceptual expertise, see Williamson (2011).
in which we learned to describe the world, in which it never is the case that $p$ while simultaneously not $p$, we can regard that intuition as a scaffolded judgment. Concerning the intuition about the necessity of this intuited content, however, the personal character of intuitions again does not warrant the generalization. Statements about the modal status of the claim are perhaps secured by correctly applying the laws of logic (like in the above mention example of the principle of contradiction), but not by my personal intuition (Alexander 2012; Pust 2014). But even if this is true and thus if such basic intuitions are always reliable, it still needs to be shown by general optimists, concerning the reliability of intuitions, how this extends to more complex phenomena like those often discussed in the intuition debate (Cappelen 2012). I take the above-discussed cases of Gettier-intuitions and Bealer’s rational intuitions as evidence that we should at least doubt that most intuitions that are taken as reliable sources of evidence are sufficiently scaffolded. Until this is shown I would advise that we stay skeptical and regard those intuitions as Unreliable Freestanding Intuitions (UFIT).

UFIT =\text{Df} \text{Many intuitions that are treated as reliable sources of evidence in philosophical theorizing lack the right scaffolding and must thus be regarded as freestanding intuitions, which makes them epistemically unreliable.}

4 Conclusion

In this commentary I have tried to show that the connections between introspection and intuitions are so profound that the debates about the two phenomena can inform each other substantially, and in particular how ideas from the introspection debate can help to clarify open questions in the intuition debate (SFIT). I have taken the idea of scaffolded and freestanding judgments from the introspection debate and applied it to that about intuitions. In so doing, I have tried to show that the wide-ranging skepticism about introspection also concerns intuitions, since many intuitions are investigated by introspecting on one’s phenomenology of certainty that typically accompanies intuitions, as well as introspection itself (IPCV). Bayne’s introduction of the scaffolded versus freestanding judgments idea suggests that a global pessimism towards introspection is not warranted by the arguments that are raised by proponents of such a position. I hope to have shown that the same is true in the case of intuitions, which can also be reliable if they are embedded in the right context, or if concerning the basic structures of our experience. The question for further discussion has now become how big the scope of both scaffolded introspective and scaffolded intuitive judgments actually is. Is it possible to develop clear-cut criteria for when a content is sufficiently scaffolded? Must one draw further distinctions and introduce different kinds, or at least a gradual concept, of scaffolding? So far, applied to often very abstract epistemic targets in philosophy, my predictions for the scope of scaffolded judgments in the on-going debates are not very optimistic. I would advise that without further argumentation for the scaffolding of abstract intuitions they are best regarded as freestanding judgments (UFIT). I agree with Sosa when he says, about the skeptical challenges to intuitions: “If that sort of consideration is a serious indictment of intuition, therefore, it seems no less serious when applied to introspection […]” (1998). The only difference might be that I hold this to be bad news for proponents of the widespread use of both phenomena, rather than a convincing defence of their general reliability.

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Introspection and Intuition

A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel

Tim Bayne

This paper is a response to Maximilian H. Engel’s commentary on my target paper, in which I provided a critical examination of pessimism accounts of the trustworthiness of introspection. Engel’s focuses on the distinction that I drew between two kinds of introspective judgments, scaffolded judgments and freestanding judgments, and suggests that this distinction might fruitfully illuminate the epistemology of intuitive judgments. I present some doubts about whether the distinction can be transferred to intuition in this way, and also sketch a more fundamental contrast between introspective judgments and intuitive judgments.

Keywords
Free-standing judgments | Introspection | Intuition | Scaffolded judgments

1 Introduction

Let me begin by thanking Maximilian H. Engel for his commentary. I take the heart of his paper to consist in the suggestion that the distinction between freestanding and scaffolded judgments which Maja Spener and I (Bayne & Spener 2010) developed in connection with introspection can be usefully applied to the epistemology of intuition. I will start by revisiting the freestanding/scaffolded distinction, before turning to Engel’s proposal.

The epistemology of introspection is that it is not flat but contains peaks of epistemic security alongside troughs of epistemic insecurity. Any attempt to understand the epistemology of introspection needs to take this landscape into account, for although our pretheoretical views concerning the epistemology of introspection are not sacrosanct they do form a useful constraint on theorizing about introspection. Any account of introspection should explain why some introspective judgments strike us as highly secure whereas others seem to be insecure.

This is where the distinction between scaffolded and freestanding judgments comes in. Both types of judgments have as their intentional objects current conscious states that one takes oneself to be in. (The notion could also be applied to judgements concerning the states...
that one is not in.) An introspective judgment is scaffolded when the subject is disposed to make a first-order judgment whose content bears a rough correspondence to that of the introspective judgment. For example, the judgment that one is experiencing a red light in front of one is scaffolded by the disposition to judge that there is a red light in front of one, whereas there is no such first-order disposition corresponding to the introspective judgment that one is merely imagining or thinking about a red light. Experiences that are the intentional objects of scaffolded judgments are themselves employed in world-directed first-order judgments, whereas that is not the case where free-standing judgments are concerned. Contrary to what Engel suggests, there is no commitment here to the idea that only scaffolded judgments are epistemically trustworthy. The idea, rather, is that scaffolded judgments have a certain kind of first-person warrant that free-standing judgments tend to lack.

2 From introspection to intuition?

Engel argues that the distinction between scaffolded and free-standing judgments can also be applied to the kinds of judgments deployed in debates about philosophical intuitions, and also suggests that most such judgments—or at least, those which are of central philosophical interest—are best regarded as free-standing, and thus lack the kind of warrant that we might want for them.

Although I welcome Engel’s attempt to extend the distinction between scaffolded and free-standing judgments beyond the domain of introspection, I am not convinced that it does much to illuminate the epistemology of intuition. The first issue that needs to be addressed is the fact that intuitive judgments don’t form a single, well-behaved class. One kind of intuitive judgment that is of philosophical interest concerns the modal structure of the world, as when one judges that it is necessarily true that 2+2=4 or that it is only contingently true that Aristotle was a philosopher. But as far as I can tell, Engel is not concerned with intuitive judgments of this kind, but with what we might call intuitions of concept application. Such judgments are concerned with the question of whether a certain concept (such as <knowledge>) ought to be applied to a certain state of affairs.

In explaining how the contrast between scaffolded and free-standing judgments might apply to intuitive judgments Engel writes:

Again taking the intuition about knowledge, what makes this intuition, even though not universal, so astonishingly stable among Western philosophers? I argue that this is due to the close match between the content of the intuition (i.e. “she doesn’t know!”) and the rules one learns to use [regarding] the concept of knowledge in our cultural niche (i.e.: “Only ascribe knowledge if a person is appropriately justified in believing a proposition!”). So in the context of Western philosophy, the intuitive judgment can be regarded as a scaffolded and thus reliable judgment. (this collection, p. 6)

It is certainly true that an individual’s use of a concept is scaffolded by the practices of the culture in which they are embedded. As Kant pointed out, we learn how to apply concepts by noting how they are applied by those around us. Kant (A134/B174) described examples as the “Gängelwagen of thought”, where a Gängelwagen is a walking frame or go-kart that is harnessed to an infant in order to help it learn to walk. But although this form of support is indeed a kind of scaffolding, it differs in important ways from the kind of scaffolding that I had in mind. In the sense of the term that Spener and I had in mind, a scaffolded judgment is a judgment that is underpinned by a disposition to make a first-order judgment whose content roughly corresponds to the content of the scaffolded judgments. As far as I can see, intuitive judgments are not scaffolded in this sense, in part because intuitive judgments are already “first-order”. So, although I would certainly agree that the possession of such concepts as <knowledge> is supported by one’s cultural niche, it doesn’t follow that the intuitive judgments about when it is and isn’t appropriate to apply this concept are scaffolded.
3 Intuitive disagreement

In closing, let me mention an important background issue concerning which Engel and I appear to have different views. Engel, I take it, holds that the disagreement in intuitive judgments regarding concept application should be regarded as epistemically troublesome in much the way that disagreement about introspective judgment is regarded as epistemically troublesome. The idea is that in both cases there are objective facts of the matter, and the existence of widespread disagreement indicates that significant numbers of individuals are systematically mistaken about what those facts are.

Although I am inclined to accept this diagnosis when it comes to many introspective disagreements, I do not find it particularly plausible when it comes to disagreements concerning intuitions of concept application. Here’s why. Suppose that Weinberg and his collaborators are right when they suggest that low-socioeconomic status individuals are disposed to apply the concept <knowledge> in contexts where high-socioeconomic status (SES) individuals are disposed to withhold it (Weinberg et al. 2001). Would it follow (as Engel seems to assume) that at least one of these groups is mistaken about a matter of objective fact? I don’t think so. It seems to me more plausible to assume that low-SES subjects and high-SES subjects simply have different concepts (or “conceptions”, if you prefer) of knowledge, and each of them is applying its own concept correctly. The two concepts are similar enough to be both associated with the single word “knowledge”, but there is no case for regarding one of these concepts as superior to the other, or for thinking that only one of them truly captures the essence of knowledge. They are simply different concepts.

If this is right, then apparent disagreement between the judgments of low-SES subjects and high-SES subjects about whether or not S knows that P is not substantive in the way in which most introspective disagreement appears to be. Moreover, it seems to me that something similar should be said concerning many (if not all) disputes about the application of other central philosophical concepts. (One needs to take the possibility of performance errors into account here, but such problems will typically be minimized in philosophical contexts.) But I wouldn’t want to commit myself to this account of all intuitive disputes. In particular, it seems to me that introspective disputes concerning modal matters are likely to to be substantive in a way in which disagreements about intuitions regarding concept application are not.

4 Conclusion

In his commentary Engel suggests that the contrast between scaffolded and freestanding judgments that Spener and I applied to introspection might also be usefully applied to intuition. Although I welcome Engel’s attempt to extend the distinction between scaffolded and freestanding judgments beyond its original sphere of application, I have suggested that such a move might not be quite as straightforward as Engel takes it to be, for there don’t appear to be any first-order judgments that might scaffold intuitive judgments in the way that first-order perceptual judgments scaffold certain kinds of introspective judgments. But although I cannot see how the distinction between scaffolded and freestanding judgments might apply to intuition, I certainly share Engel’s conviction that “comparing and contrasting” the epistemology of introspection with that of intuition is a fruitful exercise, for both domains pose the puzzle of how we might reconcile individual certainty and apparent self-evidence with intersubjective disagreement.

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