In summary, a complete theory for the neural correlates of consciousness should be able to account for the neural implementation of the contents of consciousness. John-Dylan Haynes has proposed a clever experimental approach to localizing the contents of consciousness in the human brain, and has found that the PFC does not seem to be involved in this representation. Although surprising at first sight, this null result lines up well with the overall inconclusive evidence for a direct involvement of the PFC in conscious perception. However, it remains to be seen whether localization is the most fruitful approach to identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, or whether a more dynamic view that embraces the importance of communication between brain areas will bring us closer to solving the enigma of consciousness in the brain.
Acknowledgements
CMS is supported by a Human Frontier Science Program Long-term Fellowship (LT001118/2012-L). I would like to thank Lucia Melloni for her continuous support, insightful discussions, and comments on this manuscript.