Schleim compares my theory to the famously misconceived social engineering projects of Skinner and Delgado, for whom, Schleim says, the goals blessed the means. He argues (Schleim this collection, p. 9) that these "utopian proposals" stand "in obvious conflict with the notion of autonomy", as understood by Immanuel Kant: no being must be treated only as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. I agree with Kant's principle and see no conflict between it and the notion of epigenetic proaction. There is nothing in the idea of epigenetic proaction as I develop it in my article that suggests treating people as mere means to a social end, or of allowing them to “become mere instruments for the present system” (Schleim this collection, p. 9). The idea in itself is neutral in this regard: of course the idea can be misused—all science can be misused—but it is no part of the theory to have this negative consequence. In other words, there is no essential conflict between human autonomy and human epigenetic proaction properly understood.
As for the issue of informed consent that Schleim raises in that context, it does not directly arise through the topics I address in my article, but it would arise in the research that I recommend be pursued. Epigenetic proaction is a process on the societal level. When, for example, educational structures and methods are adopted in a functioning democratic society, people are invited to express their views through political elections, public debates, consensus conferences, etc.; but we do not ask each citizen for an individual informed consent. Nor do we ask for it when laws are passed. For example, in 1979, corporeal punishment of children became illegal in Sweden. The decision was preceded (and followed) by public debate and, as with most rules and regulations, some agreed with the ruling, while others did not—but the question of informed consent does not here arise. In contrast, if research in the natural and social sciences collaborate, e.g., to develop educational structures to assist and protect adolescents during that difficult phase of cerebral development, insofar as such research requires the use of human subjects individual informed consent will be needed. That this is the case is not a specific problem of the theory, but an ethical regulation (amongst many others) that all research must respect.