Pompe-Alama seems to argue that Davidson’s argument about the impossibility of animal thought is at base an argument based on the phenomenology of thought as inner-speech. I don’t see this. His is an argument about the process of interpretation, and the interpersonal nature of objective thought. While I disagree with Davidson’s arguments, and in particular with the view that animals cannot have propositional attitudes, I am nonetheless sympathetic to the possibility that the ability to use language makes possible cognitive feats that are unavailable to nonlinguistic creatures (see e.g., Roskies 2015). These may only be quantitative differences, allowing us to represent contents that nonlinguistic creatures cannot represent, or they may be more qualitative leaps, such as giving us metarepresentational abilities that make possible culture, cross-generational learning, and science. Thus, whether Davidson is right or wrong, we are still left with the fascinating question: What does language or linguistic competence allow us to do that we otherwise couldn’t do?