This paper argues for a failure of correspondence between perceptual representation and what it is like to perceive. If what it is like to perceive is grounded in perceptual representation, then, using considerations of veridical representation, we can show that inattentive peripheral perception is less representationally precise than attentive foveal perception. However, there is empirical evidence to the contrary. The conclusion is that perceptual representation cannot ground what it is like to perceive.
Acuity | Adaptation | Appearance | Attention | Awareness | Consciousness | Content | Contrast | Endogenous attention | Exogenous attention | Grounding | Indeterminacy | Marisa Carrasco | Perception | Peripheral perception | Precision | Reductionism | Representational content | Representationism | Salience | Tyler Burge | Unconscious perception | Vagueness | Veridicality | Visual field