[1]

“Still other accounts of grounded cognition focus on situated action, social interaction, and the environment (e.g., Barsalou 2003, Barsalou et al. 2007a, Glenberg 1997, W. Prinz 1997, Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004, Robbins & Aydede 2007, E. Smith & Semin 2004, Yeh & Barsalou 2006). From this perspective, the cognitive system evolved to support action in specific situations, including social interaction. These accounts stress interactions between perception, action, the body, the environment, and other agents, typically during goal achievement. It is important to note that the phrase ‘embodied cognition’ is often used when referring to this collection of literatures. Problematically, however, ‘embodied cognition’ produces the mistaken assumption that all researchers in this community believe that bodily states are necessary for cognition and that these researchers focus exclusively on bodily states in their investigations. Clearly, however, cognition often proceeds independently of the body, and many researchers address other forms of grounding.” (Barsalou 2008, p. 619)

[2]
We find it useful to employ here the distinction originally proposed by Edmund Husserl in Husserl (1973, p. 119).
[3]
One of the major contributions to our understanding of human social cognition is provided by developmental psychology. In this paper, for sake of concision we don’t focus on developmental aspects, in spite of the crucial importance we attribute to them to thoroughly address the issues we want to address here.
[4]
It is interesting to note that this comparative perspective seems to support the hypothesis of an evolutionary continuity between human and non-human primates in relation to the emergence of language from our sensori-motor abilities. For a discussion of this topic, see Glenberg & Gallese (2012).
[5]
The expression immanent transcendence is meant to signify here the fact that the body, by means of a biological mechanism (immanent), can transcend his usual function (for example, motion) to become expression (a model or paradeigma) of this bodily knowledge.
[6]
The “transcendental quality” attributed to the body is intended to mean that the body is considered as the a priori, non-further reducible condition of the possibility of experience.
[7]
For an intriguing discussion of the historical antecedents of brain imaging techniques and a passionate criticism of the limitations of current use of brain imaging by cognitive neuroscience, see Legrenzi & Umiltà (2011).
[8]
For sake of concision and focus we do not discuss here the implicated topic of the apparently absent synchronicity between brain states and phenomenal consciousness (remember that fMRI does not provide a good temporal resolution to firmly match brain states and phenomenal consciousness). We simply want to stress the parallel existence of particular experiences and particular brain states.
[9]
The comparative approach is primarily intended here as a comparison between humans and other animals. As a consequence, it also implies a comparison between different experimental methods.
[10]
The notion of the grandmother cell was originally introduced by the neuroscientist Jerry Lettvin to refer to neurons with high integrative power, which are able to map concepts or objects. The term has since then mostly been employed with a negative connotation by supporters of a more distributed population-coding of objects, percepts, and memories. For an historical account of the notion of the grandmother cell, see Gross (2002).
[11]
Maybe no one explicitly claims this. However, it is very common that researchers neglect many (or all) of the complementary techniques that have been here suggested to be necessary and draw inferences about human social cognition and its neural implementation. As an example, see papers by Ian Apperly.
[12]
Again, for sake of concision, we do not deal here with the relationship between the notion of a core, minimal self as a bodily self and agency and body ownership. On this topic, see Gallese & Sinigaglia (2010, 2011a). Moreover, it is worth noting that the arguments proposed in this section in relation to the notion of a minimal bodily self could be applied to other non-human animals. The possibility that high-level self-awareness can emerge from a primitive and non-conceptual form of self-awareness, and that it is possible that we share this basic level of the sense of self with other non-human animals, has already been discussed. For a discussion of this and other related topics see Bermúdez (2003).
[13]

See Vogeley et al. (2003) and Vogeley et al. (2004) for an investigation of the neural correlates of the first-person perspective.

[14]
Exaptation refers to the shift in the course of evolution of a given trait or mechanism, which is later on reused to serve new purposes and functions (see Gould & Lewontin 1979).
[15]
For a discussion of different views on the notion of reuse, see Gallese (2014).
[16]
According to this perspective, linguistic syntax could originate and be modelled upon syntactic motor competence, the latter being exapted and put at the service of the new linguistic competence (see Gallese 2007, 2008).
[17]
With the expression “anthropogenic power of language” we mean that the human nature, as we know it, depends on language.
[18]
For an earlier formulation of this hypothesis, see Gallese (2013).
[19]
It is worth noting that Descartes also defended the related thesis that animals don’t have soul exactly because they do not have language. Cf. Descartes (1637).
[20]
A second-person perspective is adopted in social contexts when, implicitly or explicitly, we re-use our own experiences to understand others. On the notion of second-person perspective see Pauen (2012).