In this paper only a selection of concepts currently under discussion in the field of cognitive neuroscience could be reviewed in any detail. The selection criterion was their relatedness to consciousness studies and to some extent their relevance for epistemic issues. This led to the neglect of important domains, some of which have equally relevant bearing on philosophical questions and societal issues. Thus, no consideration was given to developmental aspects that illustrate the close correlation between the maturation of particular brain structures and the emergence of specific cognitive and social functions. Equally neglected were research on executive functions and associated concepts on intentionality, agency, mental causation, and free will. No attempts were made to explore the vast field devoted to the analysis of genuinely “psychic” phenomena, such as memories, emotions, motivations, drives, and aesthetic judgement. Finally, a much more elaborate review would have been required of research that analyzes brain functions that can only be assessed in conditions where brains interact with one another in a social context. This is the domain of the relatively recent field of social neuroscience, which studies phenomena such as confidence, greed, generosity, fairness, parasitism, altruism, compassion, and collective beliefs. This would have been particularly important in view of the attempt made at the end of this contribution to demystify some of the immaterial connotations of consciousness, in particular by redefining some aspects of consciousness as belonging to the domain of social realities, i.e., as a relational construct emerging from reciprocal interactions among brains endowed with the cognitive abilities of humans. The research agendas of these “neglected” fields are the same as those of the domains reviewed above. They all attempt to identify the neuronal mechanisms that are responsible for a particular cognitive or executive function, such that it becomes less and less important whether a cognitive phenomenon is accessible from the third-person perspective—such as the orienting behaviour of an animal—or whether it is accessible only from the first-person perspective—such as in the famous example of the hue of a rose or an emotion. As long as these qualia can be operationalized and rated on some subjective scale, they are amenable to neuroscientific inquiry. In case of the social neurosciences, the agenda is somewhat enlarged, since the objects of studies are phenomena that emerge from social interactions and exist as relational constructs only in interpersonal space. Here the objects of study are the mechanisms underlying the cognitive functions enabling the respective social interactions such as, for example, the ability to have a theory of mind and the mechanisms that permit individual brains to represent social realities. This agenda of the neurosciences may appear bold and, as the reader will have noticed, while we already know much about the component functions in our brains, we are still very far from understanding the distributive processes underlying higher cognitive and executive functions. In fact, the more data that sophisticated analytical tools allow us to accumulate, the more we are humbled by the mind-boggling and no longer intuitively graspable complexity of the brain’s dynamics. However, at least the author and probably the majority of his colleagues believe that there should be no principle epistemological barriers to the pursuit of this research agenda. The greatest problem in the near future will be that the description of the dynamics of neuronal processes underlying higher functions will take the form of abstract mathematical formulations that lack any resemblance to the experienced or observed result of these functions.
Nevertheless, the naturalistic stance taken by the neurosciences has already in these early days provided some insights, whose relevance goes beyond the research agenda of the neurosciences proper. The data on mechanisms mediating perception discussed at the beginning of this chapter clearly support constructivism and thereby provide arguments for or against particular philosophical positions. Likewise, these epistemic considerations, to the author’s surprise, led to normative consequences in the context of notions of tolerance. Similar normative consequences arise from data on mechanisms responsible for decision-making, motivation, response suppression, conscious versus subconscious processing, personality traits, and so on, as these insights are all consequential for the definition of behavioural norms and the distinction between normal and pathological behaviour. It is foreseeable, therefore, that the neurosciences will become more involved in philosophical, normative, ethical, and societal issues. This should be beneficial for all parties involved, since the communication process is likely to lead to bridging theories, new terms for mutual understanding, and amendments to discipline-specific idiosyncrasies.