As suggested in the preceding section, inclusion of the social dimension may be indispensible for defining the status of higher cognitive functions such as consciousness. But it may also help us to bridge gaps between naturalistic approaches and first-person phenomenology. Thus, surprisingly, the joint consideration of neurobiological evidence on the dependence of perception of priors and of the epigenetic modification of priors by socio-cultural factors has normative consequences for concepts of tolerance.
Human beings have a similar genetic outfit, and therefore usually agree on what they perceive—in particular when priors suffice for the interpretation of the perceived, which had been acquired during evolution in a pre-cultural world. However, this may not apply to the perception of social realities. Humans raised in different cultures may perceive social realities quite differently. Cultures may differ radically with respect to social conditions, concepts of fairness, justice, and aesthetics, as well as moral criteria, and so on. Thus, epigenetically-installed priors are likely to exhibit considerable culture-specific differences. As a consequence, the ways in which the world is perceived will also differ. Another culture specific variable likely to influence perception is the attachment to caretakers. The nature of early bonding experiences determines whether the world appears as hostile or as peaceful and secure, and whether others can be approached with confidence or scepticism. The ways in which these early attachments to other members are secured differ dramatically among different cultures and, as such, so will the perception of signals that inspire confidence or aggression. Since these early-acquired priors are implicit, and since one is unaware that perceptions are influenced by these early imprinting processes, human beings take what they perceive as “real” and see no reason to question its validity. Thus, two persons raised differently, while observing the same social situation may perceive it in completely different ways. They may come to grossly diverging ethical or moral judgments, unable to convince the other through argument that he or she is wrong, because both experience what they experience as reality—just as one experiences optical illusions as real. The problem is that, in the case of the perception of social realities, there are no “objective” measuring devices. There are different perceptions, and there is no right or wrong. This has far-reaching consequences for our concepts of tolerance. Solving such problems with majority votes is clearly not a fair solution. Assuming that one’s own position is correct and granting others the right to retain their “wrong” perceptions—so long as they do not disturb the peace—is humiliating and denies them respect. Still, this is often considered to be tolerant behaviour. What should be done, instead, is to grant everybody that her or his perceptions are correct and to postulate that this attitude be reciprocated. Only if this agreement on reciprocity is violated have the dissenting parties the right to exert sanctions.