Brüggen finds our distinction between objective and subjective imagination “very helpful” (this collection, p. 9), but she is worried about the way we flesh out the distinction. We have already answered one of her worries, which is that our account of the distinction carries a commitment to the mode-based conception of re-creation. As we have suggested, our account is compatible with the alternative, content-based conception. Another worry of Brüggen’s is that it is unclear how our notions of objective and subjective imagination differ from Vendler’s. Brüggen grounds this worry in the fact that our account leaves room for the claim that both objective and subjective imagination always involve the self implicitly (this collection, p. 5).
As far as objective imagination is concerned, our examples certainly suggest that when one objectively (e.g., visually) imagines oneself in an explicit way (e.g., as a rider or as showing a pinched face), one’s imagining can also be implicitly self-involving. This does not mean that the imaginer’s self is involved twice. Here the imaginer’s self is involved only in an explicit way (as we point out all too briefly in the beginning of section 4.1 of our target paper, our definition of implicit self-involvement excludes that the same self that is involved both implicitly and explicitly in a single imagining). The claim that objective imagination is always implicitly self-involving does not immediately follow from these examples, but it is admittedly consistent with our account.
Things are more complicated with respect to subjective imagination. We argue that the latter can be either implicitly or explicitly self-involving, although we also acknowledge that the latter is controversial, since it assumes that we can have an internal experience that explicitly represents the self as such. Taking for granted that some subjective imaginings can explicitly involve the self, it is hard to see how they can also be implicitly self-involving. This is so because of the very nature of the re-created internal experience. An internal experience can only be about a (physical or mental) state whose bearer is identical with the bearer of the experience itself. It is not possible to have a proprioceptive experience of another’s body, or to introspect someone else’s mental states. When a subjective imagining re-creates an internal experience that explicitly represents the self (the imaginer’s or someone else’s), the latter cannot but be the self of the re-created experience. Thus the imagining is not implicitly self-involving, according to our definition.
Moreover, even granting Brüggen’s claim that objective and subjective imagination always involve the self implicitly, we do not see how this leads us back to Vendler’s account of the distinction. For us, the key to the distinction is not the distinction between explicit and implicit self-involvement, but rather the distinction between external and internal experiences. Indeed, the latter distinction has to do with aspects of the self, since we have defined an internal experience as being normally de se; but, as we have seen, the de se nature of internal experiences can be explained independently of whether the self is explicitly or implicitly involved in the relevant imaginings.
Brüggen introduces the notion of an empty point of view as an additional tool for the theory of imagination. For instance, when a subject visually imagines the Panthéon, her imagining involves a perspective that is not occupied by herself or anyone else. In other words, it is not required that there be an observer in the imaginary world (the subject can visualize an unseen Panthéon). If this is the right interpretation of Brüggen’s notion of an empty point of view, we already have it in our toolbox. For we claim that the first-person perspective from which the subject is imagining the Panthéon can remain virtual or counterfactual, in the sense that she is imagining a situation from a spatial perspective that a normally-sighted subject would have if she were suitably oriented in the imaginary world.
Brüggen suggests that we could use the notion of an empty point of view to “further sharpen” the distinction between objective and subjective imagination (this collection, p. 6). The idea seems to be that objective imagination always involves an empty point of view, while subjective imagination never does. Let us grant that this idea is broadly correct. We still think that our account of objective and subjective imagination as re-creating external and internal experiences can provide a more fundamental explanation. One might claim that subjective imagination creates more ontological constraints on the imaginary world than objective imagination. A subjective imagining represents a state whose bearer can only be that of the re-created internal experience itself. If such a state is ontologically dependent on a bearer, one cannot imagine the former in a world in which the latter does not exist. Thus, subjective imagination imposes the existence of a self in the imaginary world, whether or not the self in question is explicitly represented. In contrast, since objective imagination re-creates an external experience, one might argue that it is free from the specific constraints of subjective imagination, and need not impose the existence of any self in the imaginary world.
Toward the end of her commentary, Brüggen also suggests that the notion of an empty point of view can help us to distinguish between imaginings and non-imaginative experiences. If we understand her correctly, her suggestion is that in contrast to imaginings, non-imaginative experiences must involve an occupied point of view. This is an interesting suggestion, and we do not see why we cannot take it on board. Brüggen thinks otherwise and writes: “Dokic and Arcangeli seem to think that imaginings mirror non-imaginative sates with respect to the nature of the point of view involved (again probably partly due to the notion of re-creation)” (this collection, p. 9). However, as detailed above, our account is more neutral and does not carry such a commitment. We do not posit a specific relationship between imaginings and non-imaginative states, but for the sake of argument let us put in a good word for a less neutral view. Even if one claims that imaginings mirror (or simulate) non-imaginative states in the sense that they are dependent on the latter, thus holding an asymmetrical relationship between those kinds of mental states, one is not committed to the conclusion that imaginings mirror every aspect of non-imaginative sates (e.g., the nature of the point of view). Further specifications are needed about what precisely is preserved and according to which mapping function (Arcangeli 2011b).