Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Arcangeli, M. (2011a). L’immaginazione ricreativa. Sistemi intelligenti, 23 (1), 59-74. 10.1422/34612
— (2011b). The imaginative realm and supposition. Paris, FR: University Paris 6-UPMC PhD Dissertation.
Bayne, T. & Montague, M. (Eds.) (2011). Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bermúdez, J. L. (1998). The paradox of self-consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bermúdez, J. L., Marcel, A. & Eilan, N. (1995). The body and the self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Botvinick, M. & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands “feel” touch that eyes see. Nature, 391 (6669), 756-756. 10.1038/35784
Burge, T. (2005). Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics, 33 (1), 1-78. 10.5840/philtopics20053311
Byrne, A. (2010). Recollection, perception, imagination. Philosophical Studies, 148 (1), 15-26. 10.1007/s11098-010-9508-1
Carruthers, P. & Veillet, B. (2011). The case against cognitive phenomenology. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.) Cognitive phenomenology (pp. 35-56). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2002). The roots of scientific reasoning: infancy, modularity, and the art of tracking. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich & M. Siegal (Eds.) The cognitive basis of science (pp. 73-95). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Casey, E. S. (1976). Imagining: A phenomenological study. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Cassam, Q. (1999). Self and world. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility? In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.) Conceivability and possibility (pp. 145-200). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Cole, J. (1995). Pride and a daily marathon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Crane, T. (2013). Unconscious belief and conscious thought. In U. Kriegel (Ed.) Phenomenal intentionality (pp. 156-173). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Currie, G. & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). Recreative minds: Imagination in philosophy and psychology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
De Vignemont, F. (2013). The mark of bodily ownership. Analysis, 73 (4), 643-651. 10.1093/analys/ant080
Doggett, T. & Egan, A. (2007). Wanting things you don’t want: The case for an imaginative analogue of desire. Philosophers’ Imprint, 7 (9), 1-17.
Dokic, J. (2008). Epistemic perspectives on imagination. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 243 (1), 99-118.
Dorsch, F. (2012). The unity of imagining. Berlin, GER: De Gruyter.
Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Gallese, V. (2003). The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: The quest for a common mechanism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 358 (1431), 517-528. 10.1098/rstb.2002.1234
Gendler, T. S. & Hawthorne, J. (Eds.) (2002). Conceivability and possibility. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Gibson, J. J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Gordon, R. (1995). Simulation without introspection or Inference from me to you. In M. Davies & T. Stone (Eds.) Mental simulation (pp. 53-67). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Haggard, P. (2005). Conscious intention and motor cognition. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9 (6), 290-295. 10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.012
Husserl, E. (1901). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Halle, GER: Max Niemeyer.
Jeannerod, M. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind & Language, 19 (2), 113-146. 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00251.x
Jeannerod, M. (2006). Motor cognition. What actions tell the self. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Kind, A. (2001). Putting the image back in imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62 (1), 85-109. 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00042.x
— (2011). The puzzle of imaginative desire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89 (3), 1-19. 10.1080/00048402.2010.503763
Kosslyn, S. M. (1980). Image and mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
— (1994). Image and brain: The resolution of the imagery debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L. & Ganis, G. (2006). The case for mental imagery. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Martin, M. (2002). The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language, 17 (4), 376-425. 10.1111/1468-0017.00205
McGinn, C. (2004). Mindsight: image, dream, meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Meinong, A. (1902). Über Annahmen. Leipzig, GER: Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth.
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one., The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
— (2013). The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy. Frontiers in Psychology, 4 (931), 1-19. 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931
Mulligan, K. (1999). La varietà e l’unità dell'immaginazione. Rivista di Estetica, 11 (2), 53-67.
Nichols, S. & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading: An integrated account of pretence, self-awareness, and understanding other minds. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. (2006). Imaginative blocks and impossibility: An essay in modal psychology. The architecture of the imagination. New essays on pretense, possibility, and fiction (pp. 237-256). Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Noordhof, P. (2002). Imagining objects and imagining experiences. Mind and Language, 17 (4), 426-455. 10.1111/1468-0017.00206
O’Shaughnessy, B. (1980). The will: a dual aspect theory. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
Pacherie, E. (2007). The sense of control and the sense of agency. Psyche, 13 (1), 1-30.
Peacocke, C. (1985). Imagination, possibility and experience: A berkeleian view defended. In J. Foster & H. Robinson (Eds.) Essays on berkeley (pp. 19-35). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
— (2014). The mirror of the world. Subjects, consciousness, and self-consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. (2011). On knowing one’s self. In S. Gallagher (Ed.) The oxford handbook of the self (pp. 370-391). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2002). Mental imagery: In search of a theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25 (2), 157-182. 10.1017/S0140525X02000043
Recanati, F. (2007). Perspectival thought: a plea for (moderate) relativism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
— (2012). Mental files. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Matelli, M., Bettinardi, V., Paulesu, E., Perani, D. & Fazio, F. (1996). Localization of grasp representations in humans by PET. 1. Experimental Brain Research, 111 (2), 246-252. 10.1007/bf00227301
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L. & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2 (9), 661-670. 10.1038/35090060
Schacter, D. L. & Addis, D. R. (2007). The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory: remembering the past and imagining the future. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 362 (1481), 773-786. 10.1098/rstb.2007.2087
Tye, M. (1991). The imagery debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
— (2009). Consciousness revisited: Materialism without phenomenal concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vendler, Z. (1984). The matter of minds. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Walton, K. L. (1990). Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Weinberg, J. & Meskin, A. (2006a). Imagine that! In M. Kieran (Ed.) Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art (pp. 222-235). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
— (2006b). Puzzling over the imagination: Philosophical problems, architectural solutions. In S. Nichols (Ed.) The architecture of the imagination: New essays on pretence, possibility, and fiction (pp. 175-202). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
White, A. (1990). The language of imagination. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Williams, B. (1976). Problems of the self: philosophical papers 1956-1972. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, T. (2008). The philosophy of philosophy. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Windt, J. M. (2014). Dreaming: A conceptual framework for philosophy of mind and empirical research. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wollheim, R. (1984). The thread of life. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.