The Fragile Nature of the Social Mind

A Commentary on Alva Noë

Commentator

Miriam Kyselo

miriam.kyselo @ gmail.com

Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, Netherlands

Target Author

Alva Noë

noe @ berkeley.edu

University of California

Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.

Editors

Thomas Metzinger

metzinger @ uni-mainz.de

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität

Mainz, Germany

Jennifer M. Windt

jennifer.windt @ monash.edu

Monash University

Melbourne, Australia

In this paper I argue that while Noë’s actionist approach offers an excellent elaboration of classical approaches to conceptual understanding, it risks underestimating the role of social interactions and relations. Noë’s approach entails a form of body-based individualism according to which understanding is something the mind does all by itself. I propose that we adopt a stronger perspective on the role of sociality and consider the human mind in terms of socially enacted autonomy. On this view, the mind depends constitutively on engaging with and relating to others. As a consequence, conceptual understanding must be seen as a co-achievement. It is a fragile endeavour precisely because it depends not only on the individual but also on the continuous contribution of other subjects.

Keywords

Body-social problem | Enactive self | Fragility | Socially enacted autonomy | Socially extended mind