In the following commentary I will first briefly review the target article, then voice some critical points, and last offer a positive proposal according to which tension in self-deception is a kind of a metacognitive feeling. Proust offers a novel, inspiring view that feelings possess an indexical (non-conceptual) format, are transparent (that is, they may be re-described in propositional terms, but not thereby changed), and acquire valence if the rate of change towards fulfilling the given affordance is greater or less than expected. In my critique I will first point to difficulties in disentangling feelings from emotions, then try to provide a more precise description of the formal object of feelings, along with some examples, and offer a definition of “directness” that is consistent with predictive coding—as well as argue that feelings might be influenced by concepts even if they themselves are non-conceptual. Last, I propose that tension in self-deception is a metacognitive feeling.
Affective feelings | Appraisal | Metacognitive or noetic feelings | Predictive coding | Self-deception | Two-factor account