The Diversity of Bayesian Explanation

A Reply to Dominic L. Harkness

Author

Jakob Hohwy

jakob.hohwy @ monash.edu

Monash University

Melbourne, Australia

Commentator

Dominic L. Harkness

dharkness @ uni-osnabrueck.de

Universität Osnabrück

Osnabrück, Germany

Editors

Thomas Metzinger

metzinger @ uni-mainz.de

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität

Mainz, Germany

Jennifer M. Windt

jennifer.windt @ monash.edu

Monash University

Melbourne, Australia

My claim is that, if we understand the function of the brain in terms of the free energy principle, then the brain can explain the mind. Harkness discusses some objections to this claim, and proposes a cautious way of solidifying the explanatory potential of the free energy principle. In this response, I sketch a wide, diverse, and yet pleasingly Bayesian conception of scientific explanation. According to this conception, the free energy principle is already richly explanatory.

Keywords

Bayesian explanation | Free-energy principle | Functionalism | Mechanistic explanation | Philosophy of neuroscience | Scientific explanation | Scientific unification