The Causal Role(s) of Intentions

A Reply to Andrea R. Dreßing

Author

Elisabeth Pacherie

elisabeth.pacherie @ ens.fr

Ecole Normale Supérieure

Paris, France

Commentator

Andrea R. Dreßing

andrea.dressing @ uniklinik-freiburg.de

Klinik für Neurologie und Neurophysiologie Universitätsklinikum Freiburg

Freiburg, Germany

Editors

Thomas Metzinger

metzinger @ uni-mainz.de

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität

Mainz, Germany

Jennifer M. Windt

jennifer.windt @ monash.edu

Monash University

Melbourne, Australia

In her commentary (Dreßing this collection) on my target article (Pacherie this collection), Dreßing suggests that the story I offer is not just a creation myth but also an attempt to give an explanation of the function of conscious intentions in the physical world and as such answerable to both metaphysical and empirical constraints. Here, I try to clarify which of my claims should be understood as simply speculations about the origins of our capacity of intentions and which I take to be empirical claims. In response to the metaphysical and empirical challenge Dreßing raises, I argue that Dretske’s distinction between structuring and triggering causes may help us see how explanations in terms of physical properties and explanations in terms of mental properties may not compete but rather complement each other. I argue that this distinction may also help us assuage certain worries raised by neuroscientific findings.

Keywords

Causal exclusion | Conscious agents | Conscious intention | Creation myth | Intentional action | Intentions | Joint action | Mental causation | Neuronal correlates of intentions | Structuring causes | Triggering causes