Aaron Gutknecht closes his comments by considering future aspects. Again, we agree with his recommendations and have, partly, indeed started with two of the aspects addressed. We applied the internal model in a cooperative scenario in which the visual impression of another agent performing an action was mapped onto the system’s own internal body model. In this way the internal model was driven by the visual input and the internal model reenacted what the other agent was doing. This mapping allows one to connect the experiences of somebody else to one’s own action repertoire as one steps into the shoes of the other (Schilling 2011; see also Gallese & Cuccio this collection). Second, as mentioned in the main text, shared circuits are required for an agent to represent the action of a partner (Cruse & Schilling this collection, figure 9). In order to allow for ToM, an additional separate representation of the partner’s memory is required (figure 10). To be able to apply a supermodel (or we-model, Tomasello 2009), a more complex model is required (see Cruse & Schilling 2011, figure 6).