We appreciate the comments given by Aaron Gutknecht very much, in particular his discussion and clarification of the term “emergence” and its philosophical background. This discussion comprises a sensible completion of our article going beyond the scope of our expertise. In this context, Aaron Gutknecht correctly states that our way of using the term “emergence” may cover two aspects, one called “weak emergence”, the other he addressed as “implementational emergence”. We have – possibly forming some kind of common denominator - a third characterization in mind, one that covers different description levels: a phenomenon is considered emergent if it turns out that known properties of the network could also be characterized on a different level of description than the one currently used. On this different level the phenomenon conceptually constitutes a term or definition. If we, for example, describe the structure and function of reaCog on the neuronal level, we may realize at some point that there are behavioral aspects which could, by an outside observer, be characterized by a term that is not defined at a neuronal level of description, such as, for example, “intention”.