[1]
The same criticism may to some extent also apply to representationalist theories of consciousness and dreaming, depending on which externalist or internalist version of representationalism the theory is committed to.
[2]
For a recent exchange, see Hobson & Schredl (2011) and related commentaries in the International Journal of Dream Research (2011, vol. 4).
[3]

Another popular theory of dreaming postulates that the realistic simulation of character–self interactions serves the function of emotion regulation during dreaming (Nielsen & Lara-Carrasco 2007). In this group of theories, the function of dreaming is proposed to be the calming down of emotional surges, such as we see in psychotherapy (Hartmann 1995, 1996, 1998), or as reflecting the extinguishing of fear memories (Nielsen & Levin 2007). It is increasingly apparent that sleep plays a role in the consolidation of emotional memories, but whether sleep also regulates the emotional charge and valence of memories is not yet entirely clear (for a recent review, see Deliens et al. 2014). Thus, whether the emotional regulation theory has specific implications or predictions for social simulations in dreaming is not evident.