Gottschling seems less optimistic about the contribution of the third section of my paper. She dismisses speculations I derive from considering third-person science from the vantage of first-person experience, as a “largely unnecessary strategic move” (Gottschling this collection, p. 1) that “does not seem to fit with the rest of the project” (p. 22). I concur with Gottschling that first person experience can be assessed from the third person perspective of science without also considering objective science from a first-person perspective. In the past I have routinely considered what science has to say about first-person experience without considering the other side of the coin (e.g., Schooler 2002; Schooler et al. 2011; Schooler et al. 2015). Clearly the two sides of the discussion are not logically co-dependent on one another.
I acknowledge that the final section of the paper was not necessary for shoring up any of my arguments in the second section. Nevertheless I maintain that it adds an important balance to the discussion by illustrating the potential value of considering both first- and third-person approaches from the vantage of the alternative perspective. In this concluding section of my paper, I change my frame-of-reference from a third- to a first-person perspective, and consider the current assumptions of science from this vantage. I identify three aspects of existence that I argue are axiomatic from a first-person perspective, including: the existence of experience, the flow of time, and the fact that the present is qualitatively different from the past or the future. I argue that all three of these essential elements are either unexplained by science (i.e., experience) or outright discounted as an illusion of consciousness (i.e., the flow of time, the privileged present). I contend that while many aspects of experience could be illusory, it is hard (indeed impossible for me) to conceive of how experience, the flow of time, or the privileged nature of the present could be among them. On these grounds, I suggest that there may be something missing from the current account of objective science and speculate that an additional subjective dimension of time might fit the bill. I argue that a subjective dimension of time would provide: 1) a realm of reality for experience to reside, 2) the additional degree of freedom necessary to enable the flow of time in physics’ current “block universe”, and 3) a way to conceptualize the present. I readily acknowledge that such an account is highly speculative, but I offer it as an example of the type of meta-perspective that I think could emerge by attempting to reconcile the axioms required for both objective and subjective frames-of-reference.
Gottschling’s assessment of my arguments in this section are largely a rehash of standard critiques of the “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983) and the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1996). The standard refrain is that the inability of science to account for subjectivity corresponds to an epistemological gap not an ontological one. The fact that we cannot explain something, and perhaps never will be able to, does not require us to assume a different ontological foundation for reality. I concede that this kind of mysterian (McGinn 1989) account of the explanatory gap, although profoundly unsatisfying, is difficult to dispute. However, she largely ignores the more novel aspects of my arguments. Namely, she disregards my claim that not only is the current physicalist account unable to explain consciousness, it outright rejects two additional subjectively self-evident aspects of reality. It rejects the flow of time and the privileged present. While she acknowledges in a footnote that she finds this aspect of the paper “inspiring,” it does not impact her overall dismissal of the need for a meta-perspective. As she puts it, “what the proposed meta-perspective might be and how it is helpful despite acknowledging our common sense intuition eludes my understanding not at an epistemological level but at an ontological level” (Gottschling this collection, p. 23).
Gottschling’s reaction to the third section of my paper was not unexpected. As I noted in the close of my paper, “my arguments on this point will likely remain wholly unpersuasive to those who cannot conceive of subjective experience as offering an epistemological authority that rivals science.” I recognize that it will be an uphill battle to persuade philosophers and scientists steeped in the supremacy of the third-person perspective to consider that conclusions drawn from our own experience could possibly carry ramifications comparable to conventional objective science. But at the end of the day all of the science that we believe we know is necessarily delivered to us through our subjective experience. While what we know about objective reality is necessarily dependent on experience, the same is not the case for experience. Objective reality could conceivably be an illusion. This could all be a dream or we could be the proverbial brain in a vat. But the experience of objective reality is unquestionable, as even an illusory experience is still an experience. Given that the existence of objective reality is ultimately on less certain ground than the existence of experience, it is far from obvious why the third-person frame-of-reference holds its current unchallenged dominion.