Kathinka Evers summarises research on the epigenesis of neural networks to describe a vision of epigenetical proactivism, a development of new training and therapeutic programs to improve humans. She asks whether we can be epigenetically proactive, pointing out the benefits of decreasing the prevalence of adolescent and interconfessional violence, and in so doing develops her answer: yes, in principle, we can be epigenetically proactive. However, she also describes a naturalistic responsibility to do this, which is the point at which my discussion of her proposal diverged from her view. Particularly with respect to autonomy and free choice I think that, for the time being, we should not be epigenetically proactive; and we should be even more cautious when interventions in children’s and teenagers’ brains are at issue. Minor caveats are related to the possible psychological side-effects of decreasing our disposition towards aggression and increasing that of sympathy, as well as a more optimistic view of how humankind is developing.
In this paper, I also related epigenetic proactivism to the human enhancement debate more generally, which has become much more comprehensive than can be addressed in such a brief commentary. It was important to examine the definition of wellbeing and the framing of urgency, as well as the primary level of intervention—bio-psychological or social—, issues that are also related to autonomy. This does not mean that knowledge on epigenetics could not be used in another manner for the purposes of enhancement, in situations where people can make an informed decision for themselves whether and how to engage in a certain kind of training. In this sense, it would be interesting to compare epigenetic proactivism to other non-pharmaceutical means of enhancement, such as nutrition, exercise, sleep, or meditation (Dresler et al. 2013). Generally speaking, the knowledge described by Evers could also be related to debates on improving school education neuroscientifically (Hook & Farah 2013; Posner & Rothbart 2005). Furthermore, when targeting human capacities that are also salient for moral cognition, the debate on moral enhancement may be an important reference point with overlapping prospects and concerns (Douglas 2008, 2013; Harris 2011).
Evers warned that science has been hijacked repeatedly throughout history and that in particular the dream of creating perfect human beings has a sordid past. Here I whole-heartedly agree with her and her related call for historic awareness. I hope that I have succeeded in showing why, beyond this awareness, it is also essential to take people’s own views and autonomy into account. It may not only be the case that too much focus on enhancing people makes them sad by focusing too much on their deficiencies (Schleim 2014b; Schopenhauer 1874), but in the attempt to create superhuman beings a human catastrophe might also be provoked.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the two editors as well as two anonymous reviewers for their extraordinarily helpful and constructive comments on a previous version of this paper.