In “Naturalizing Metaethics,” I try to establish that core questions in metaethics lend themselves to empirical investigation. I argue that we can potentially adjudicate long-standing debates by testing predictions made by competing metaethical theories. I also make some conjectures about how such empirical investigations will turn out. Based on a small selection of preliminary findings, I advance a case of a version of sentimentalism—the view that emotions are essential to moral judgments. I also suggest that sentimentalism commits me to internalism—the view that moral judgments are essentially motivating—and I advance an empirical case for cognitivism—the claim that moral judgments are, like other assertions, capable of being true or false.
In his insightful commentary, Yann Wilhelm offers clarifications and challenges to my arguments. First, he asks whether my naturalism is compatible with traditional approaches in philosophy. I imply that the two can co-exist in a complementary way, but Wilhelm suggests that my naturalism is more radical than it appears. I am forced to agree, and to clarify the co-existence claim. Wilhelm also challenges my case for internalism, distinguishing two different forms and suggesting I am only in a position to argue for one of them. I am open to that possibility, but I also sketch a strategy for defending both forms. Wilhelm concludes with a challenge to my defense of cognitivism. He provides non-cognitivists with an explanation for findings that I say they cannot explain. I offer a cognitivist response, but grant that this proposal demands empirical attention.
Wilhelm’s commentary provides a valuable contribution to empirically oriented metaethics. He offers strategies for avoiding certain kinds of debates with opponents of naturalism, and he identifies empirical issues that can be used to settle debates between card-carrying naturalists. Wilhelm deepens my understanding of these issues and strengthens my optimism about the prospects of naturalistic metaethics.