I have suggested that the sense of self-as-subject can be explicated by examining the sense of experiential ownership, which is distinct from the sense of body ownership. Having a conscious experience secures only the fact of experiential ownership, not the sense of experiential ownership. This provides a reinterpretation of the distinction between the sense of self-as-object and the sense of self-as-subject. I elucidated the sense of self-as-object by looking at the sense of body ownership, and the sense of self-as-subject by examining the sense of experiential ownership. It became clear that both can misrepresent. The possibility of misrepresentation makes the sense of self-as-subject open to empirical as well as philosophical investigations. It is important to investigate how misrepresentation of the sense of experiential ownership is generated. This requires us to identify the right research question—which, I suggest, is precisely the Wittgenstein Question. When examining pathological cases or conducting experiments, researchers should ask their subjects questions like: “Are you sure it is you who is feeling your niece’s sensations?” or “Are you sure it is you who is shaking your own hand?” Then psychophysical and fMRI experiments can be developed to study the subjects’ responses. As such, to move forward, the first step is to look for and then to study the various conditions about which one can pursue the Wittgenstein Question.