According to Kühle, our results suggest that insight may be considered a state. Moreover, she claims that the LuCiD scale does not allow for the identification of different lucidity levels. These assumptions are not to be deduced from our research but must stem from a misconception or misunderstanding of the factorial structure of the LuCiD scale. Concerning this matter, we reported that dream consciousness can be described by eight factors, six of which are capable of distinguishing between lucid and non-lucid dreams: insight, control, dissociation, positive emotion, negative emotion, and memory. A person can have a range of scores in each factor, for example in insight, such that scores are graded and allow for varying degrees of lucidity. Furthermore, the factors identified are correlated, i.e., not independent (see Voss et al. 2013), which means that one factor alone may not be sufficient to define a lucid dream. Our results also suggest that a dream might be considered lucid even with low scores of insight! So the assumption that the state of lucid dreaming is equivalent to the proposed state of insight cannot be inferred from our data. Kühle’s proposal reveals another problem, however, that we tried to address with our Space of Consciousness model (SoC), which is the definition of “state”. What is the relationship between a state of arousal and a state of consciousness? In the case of insight, the recognition “I am dreaming” may be only a fleeting thought. But this thought is embedded in relatively enduring neurophysiological patterns such as regional changes in blood oxygen levels (see Dresler et al. 2012) and enhanced gamma activity in frontal regions (Voss et al. 2009; Voss et al. 2014). Our suggestion to situate lucid dreaming within the SoC attempts to incorporate theses observations. In my view, a state is comparable to background activity enabling or disabling certain transients such as thoughts or memories. It is courageous to consider a fleeting thought a state, and I think such definition would need more detailed specifications. Of course, one may ask whether a dream would be considered lucid even in the absence or perhaps following the thought “this is a dream”. According to our model, this assumption would have to be affirmed. If the state of lucid dreaming is considered a neurophysiological state of sleep bordering wakefulness, enabling the mind to produce a transient thought (insightful thought), this thought may or may not be repeated several times within the state of lucid dreaming. The important factor is, as Kühle proposes, capability. During the state of lucid dreaming, the mind is able to be insightful. It is not the other way around, such that the mind is able to enter a lucid dream during the thought of insight. The importance of insightful thought thus does not lie in its being a state but in it being measurable! We cannot expect a subject to provide a truthful answer to the question “were your frontal lobes producing gamma band activity?” We can, though, ask about the quality of their thoughts and sensations. Finally, if, in spite of my objections, we define insight as a state of consciousness, how would this state be defined in terms of arousal (see the SoC model), or in terms of other determinants such as, for example, judging, sensing, or moving? Supposed insight were defined as a point in the SoC. Where would it be located? Within mindwandering, meditation, lucid dreaming, focused attention—or all of these?