Phenomenal Precision and Some Possible Pitfalls—A Commentary on Ned Block1 Introduction: Running representationism into the ground2 “Phenomenal precision”3 Block’s precision argument3.1 The stimulus and the conditions of viewing3.2 The evidence for attention influencing appearance3.3 The contents and degree of r–precision in different conditions3.4 Estimating the degree of p–precision in the different conditionsPerceptual wholes and perceptual parts3.4.2 Unattended parts can share character with attended parts3.4.3 An estimation of p–precision in the different conditions3.5 The argument4 On the notion of “phenomenal precision”4.1 Lower bounds of p–precision4.2 A need for solely generic phenomenology?4.3 Introspective imprecision?4.4 Limitation on characters?5 Conclusion