Ashby, W. R. (1947). Principles of the self-organizing dynamic system. The Journal of General Psychology, 37 (2), 125-128. 10.1080/00221309.1947.9918144
Baldi, P., & Itti, L. (2010). Of bits and wows: A Bayesian theory of surprise with applications to attention. Neural Networks, 23 (5), 649-666. 10.1016/j.neunet.2009.12.007
Blake, R. & Logothetis, N .K. (2002). Visual competition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3 (1), 13-21.
Bongard, J., Zykov, V., & Lipson, H. (2006). Resilient machines through continuous self-modeling. Science, 314 (5802), 1118-1121. 10.1126/science.1133687
Botvinick, M. & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see. Nature, 391 (6669), 756-756. 10.1038/35784
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36 (3), 181-204. 10.1017/S0140525X12000477
— (2015). Embodied Prediction. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND (pp. 1-21). Frankfurt a. M., GER: MIND Group.
Feyerabend, P. (1962). Explanation, reduction and empiricism. In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (Eds.) Scientific explanation, space, and time (pp. 28-97). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
FitzGerald, T. H., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. J. (2014). Model averaging, optimal inference and habit formation. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8 (457), 1-11. 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00457
Friston, K. J. (2009). The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13 (7), 293-301. 10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005
— (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11 (2), 127-138. 10.1038/nrn2787
Friston, K. J., Adams, R., Perrinet, L., & Breakspear, M. (2012). Perceptions as hypotheses: saccades as experiments. Frontiers in Psychology, 3 (151), 1-20. 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00151
Froese, T. (2014). Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia. Cognitive Neuroscience, 5 (2), 126-127. 10.1080/17588928.2014.905521
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009). Darwinian populations and natural selection. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Gregory, R. L. (1980). Perceptions as hypotheses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 290 (1038), 181-197. 10.1098/rstb.1980.0090
Hohwy, J. (2010). The hypothesis testing brain: some philosophical applications. In W. Christensen, E. Schier & J. Sutton (Eds.) Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (pp. 135-144). Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.. 10.5096/ASCS200922
— (2012). Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain. Frontiers in Psychology, 3 (96), 1-14. 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096
— (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
— (2014). Elusive phenomenology, counterfactual awareness, and presence without mastery. Cognitive Neuroscience, 5 (2), 127-128. 10.1080/17588928.2014.906399
Hohwy, J., Roepstorff, A. & Friston, K. (2008). Predictive coding explains binocular rivalry: An epistemological review. Cognition, 108 (3), 687-701. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.05.010
Itti, L. & Baldi, P. (2009). Bayesian surprise attracts human attention. Vision Research, 49 (10), 1295 - 1306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2008.09.007
Kaspar, K., König, S., Schwandt, J., & König, P. (2014). The experience of new sensorimotor contingencies by sensory augmentation. Consciousness and Cognition, 28, 47-63. 10.1016/j.concog.2014.06.006
Kuhn, T. S. (1974). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Kärcher, S. M, Fenzlaff, S., Hartmann, D., Nagel, S. K., & König, P. (2012). Sensory augmentation for the blind. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6 (37), 1-15. Frontiers Media SA.. 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00037
LaBerge, S. & DeGracia, D. J. (2000). Varieties of lucid dreaming experience. In R. G. Kunzendorf & B. Wallace (Eds.) Individual differences in conscious experience (pp. 269-307). Amsterdam, NL: John Benjamins.
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & Musgrave, A. (Eds.) Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp. 91-196). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Madary, M. (2014). Perceptual presence without counterfactual richness. Cognitive Neuroscience, 5 (2), 131-132. 10.1080/17588928.2014.907257
Metzinger, T. K. (2013). Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research. Frontiers in Psychology, 4 (746). 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00746
Mroczko, A., Metzinger, T., Singer, W., & Nikolić, D. (2009). Immediate transfer of synesthesia to a novel inducer. Journal of Vision, 9 (12), 1-8. 10.1167/9.12.25
Nagel, S. K., Carl, C.,Kringe, T., Märtin, R., & König, P. (2005). Beyond sensory substitution--learning the sixth sense. Journal of Neural Engineering, 2 (4), 13-26. 10.1088/1741-2560/2/4/R02
Nickles, T. (2014). Scientific revolutions. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-revolutions/
Noë, A. (2006). Experience without the head. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.) Perceptual experience (pp. 411-434). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Oberheim, E. & Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2013). The incommensurability of scientific theories. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/
Pearl, J. (1988). Embracing causality in default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 35 (2), 259-271. 10.1016/0004-3702(88)90015-X
Popper, K. R. (2005[1934]). Logik der Forschung. Tübingen, GER: Mohr Siebeck.
Proust, J. (2013). Mental acts as natural kinds. In A. Clark, J. Kiverstein & T. Vierkant (Eds.) Decomposing the will (pp. 262-280). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Seth, A. K. (2014). A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia. Cognitive Neuroscience, 5 (2), 97-118. 10.1080/17588928.2013.877880
— (2015). The Cybernetic Bayesian Brain. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND (pp. 1-25). Frankfurt a. M., GER: MIND Group.
Von Helmholtz, H. (1959). Die Tatsachen in der Wahrnehmung. Zählen und Messen. Darmstadt, GER: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Waskan, J. (2008). Knowledge of counterfactual Interventions through cognitive models of mechanisms. International Studies in Philosophy of Science, 22 (3), 259-275. 10.1080/02698590802567308
Windt, J. M. (2010). The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9 (2), 295-316. 10.1007/s11097-010-9163-1
Wu, W. (2013). Mental action and the threat of automaticity. In A. Clark, J. Kiverstein & T. Vierkant (Eds.) Decomposing the will (pp. 244-261). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.