Naturalizing Metaethics

Author

Jesse Prinz

jesse @ subcortex.com

City University of New York

New York, NY, U.S.A.

Commentator

Yann Wilhelm

ywilhelm @ students.uni-mainz.de

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität

Mainz, Germany

Editors

Thomas Metzinger

metzinger @ uni-mainz.de

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität

Mainz, Germany

Jennifer M. Windt

jennifer.windt @ monash.edu

Monash University

Melbourne, Australia

Decades ago, it was suggested that epistemology could be naturalized, meaning, roughly, that it could be treated as an empirically-informed psychological inquiry. In more recent years, there has been a concerted effort to naturalize ethics, with a focus on questions in moral psychology, and occasional normative ethics. Less effort has been put into the naturalization of metaethics: the study of what, if anything, makes moral judgments true. The discussion presents a systematic overview of core questions in metaethics, and argues that each of these can be illuminated by psychological research. These include questions about realism, expressivism, error theory, and relativism. Metaethics is beholden to moral psychology, and moral psychology can be studied empirically. The primary goal is to establish empirical tractability, but, in so doing, the paper also takes a provisional stance on core questions, defending a view that is relativist, subjective, and emotionally grounded.

Keywords

Error theory | Expressivism | Metaethics | Moral realism | Naturalism | Relativism | Sentimentalism