[1]
For a brief explanation of the terms, see Newen this collection, pp. 1-2.
[2]
Such a view can already be found in Goldman’s work. He endorses a hybrid account of mindreading, which describes “a number of ways to blend simulation and theorizing elements into a mosaic of mindreading possibilities” (Goldman 2006, p. 43).
[3]
I am well aware of the fact that there are many shades of both cognitivist and enactive views. I will therefore focus on the views of the authors that have been cited by Newen in the target paper. For a general introduction, see for example Thompson (2010); Varela et al. (1993); Rowlands (2009).
[4]
The difference between enactive and phenomenological theories seems to boil down to the explanatory scope. While enactivism explicitly claims to offer a radically different alternative to cognitivism and thus builds a proper account of cognition (Varela et al. 1993) phenomenology is mostly seen as a description of experiential phenomena (Gallagher 2008).
[5]
Although this seems to be a rather “old” view, it is currently celebrating a comeback. Jakob Hohwy, for example, claims that the consequences of advocating predictive processing (2013; see also Clark 2013a) are to adopt a fully internalist picture of the mind. In his words, there is an “evidentiary boundary” (Hohwy 2014, p. 6) between what has to be inferred (viz., hidden causes in the external world) and the inference device (the brain). Accordingly, all the processing takes place within this boundary, which happens to be the skull (cf. ibid., p. 8). Please note, though, that both Clark and Seth propose a more embodied perspective on prediction (Clark this collection; Seth this collection).
[6]
In the following, I will use the requirement of intermediary steps as the distinctive feature that differentiates directness and indirectness. In doing so, I follow De Vignemont: “There is a direct access if and only if the causal transmission of information is direct and does not involve intermediary steps” (2010, p. 291).
[7]
“It is the problem of describing the abstract computational principles as well as the implementational mechanics by which a system’s phenomenal self-model (PSM; cf. Metzinger 2003, 2007) is anchored in low-level physical dynamics, in a maximally parsimonious way, and without assuming a single, central module for global self-representation.” (Metzinger 2014, p. 272)
[8]
I have argued before that a simple combination of cognitivist, representational, and enactive, non-representational perspectives results in a metaphysically incoherent view. One could ask why it should now be possible for 1-3E to put together non-representational and representational levels of description. As I have described earlier, most enactive theories reject representations entirely (e.g., Fuchs & Jaegher 2009, p. 466). That is one important reason why such a view is incompatible with representational theories. Grounding theories, however, take a different perspective on representations. They view them as grounded in bodily processes (cf. Pezzulo et al. 2013, pp. 6). As such, representations can be seen as a phenomenon that gradually emerges within an embodied system (cf. Metzinger 2014, p. 278).
[9]
He gives, though, an example of phenomenal dream states, showing how (parts of) the body model is grounded in bodily structures and processes. Physical eye movements, in this case, most likely ground the phenomenal experience in lucid dreaming (cf. Metzinger 2014, p. 276).
[10]
For a more detailed description of former usage of the terms, see Metzinger 2003, pp. 345–358.
[11]
Metzinger uses a similar example: “With regard to the phenomenology of visual experience transparency means that we are not able to see something, because it is transparent. We don’t see the window, but only the bird flying by.” (2003, p. 358)
[12]
Note that Schilling and Cruse have already used the abbreviation “1-3SE” to describe levels of situated embodiment. I thus chose a lower case “s” to emphasize the difference (cf. Schilling & Cruse 2008, p. 72).
[13]
“There is, so to speak, nothing that gets in the way, and it is not as if I am first directed at an intermediary, something different from the state, and then only in a secondary step target it.” (Zahavi 2011, p. 548).
[14]
Note that this is a speculative claim, since almost none of the studies contain phenomenological reports. It could be fruitful, however, for future research to pay more attention to the experience that participants have in a specific experimental setting. This would help to understand which kind of epistemic mechanism generates which kind of experience.
[15]
“The problem of agent-identification, however, is solved by the fact that other premotor neurons (the canonical neurons) and, presumably many other neuron populations as well, fire only when the monkey performs the action and not when it observes it performed by another agent. This is indeed another critical feature of the shared representations concept: they overlap only partially, and the non-overlapping part of a given representation can be the cue for attributing the action to the self or to the other. The same mechanism operates in humans. Neuroimaging experiments where brain activity was compared during different types of simulated actions (e.g., intending actions and preparing for execution, imagining actions, observing actions performed by other people) revealed, first, that there exists a cortical network common to all conditions, to which the inferior parietal lobule (areas 39 and 40), the ventral premotor area (ventral area 6), and part of SMA contribute; and second, that motor representations for each individual condition are clearly specified by the activation of cortical zones which do not overlap between conditions […].” (Jeannerod & Pacherie 2004, pp. 131–132)
[16]
Sharing means that representational content overlaps, at least partially. For a more detailed discussion on sharing, see De Vignemont 2014b; Jeannerod & Pacherie 2004.