[1]
For further discussion cf. Jacob 1997, pp. 256–269.
[2]
Although the relevance-based approach advocated by Sperber & Wilson (1986) and Wilson & Sperber (2004) departs in some interesting respects from Grice’s (1969, 1989) own approach, I will nonetheless call their approach "Gricean" because, in the context of the present paper, the continuities between the two frameworks are far more important than the discontinuities.
[3]
For brevity, I’ll use “speaker” instead of “communicative agent”. But of course not all communicative actions are verbal.
[4]
For significant discussion and defense of the view that it is the etiological function of mental representations to carry information, in response to Milikan’s criticisms, cf. Neander (1995, 2007), Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Shea (2007). Cf. the recent exchange between Neander (2011) and Millikan (2011) For a criticism of Millikan’s view, cf. Pietroski (1992) and see Millikan’s (2000) reply.
[5]
Cf. Godfrey-Smith (2013) and Artiga (forthcoming) for further elaborate discussion of the requirement of cooperation as a condition on application of the sender-receiver structure.
[6]
Including the arbitrariness of the relation between particular word-types and what they mean (sense and/or reference).
[7]
Cf. Millikan (2000, Ch. 6), Millikan (2004, Ch. 9), Millikan (2005, Ch. 10).
[8]
Cf. Recanati (2002) for a defense of Millikan’s thesis.
[9]
A nice example suggested by a referee is “There is no beer left”, where the audience does not take the speaker to mean that there is no beer left in the universe, but instead in some properly restricted domain (e.g., some relevant fridge).
[10]
As Godfrey-Smith (2013, p. 45) observes, sameness of interests in human cooperation can be safely assumed in small contemporary communities, but not on a large scale, and nor in an evolutionary context.
[11]
Note that this quote seems to presuppose the negation of the separability thesis.