Memory for Prediction Error Minimization: From Depersonalization to the Delusion of Non-Existence

A Commentary on Philip Gerrans

Commentator

Ying-Tung Lin

linyingtung @ gmail.com

國立陽明大學
National Yang-Ming University

Taipei, Taiwan

Target Author

Philip Gerrans

philip.gerrans @ adelaide.edu.au

University of Adelaide

Adelaide, Australia

Editors

Thomas Metzinger

metzinger @ uni-mainz.de

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität

Mainz, Germany

Jennifer M. Windt

jennifer.windt @ monash.edu

Monash University

Melbourne, Australia

Depersonalization is an essential step in the development of the Cotard delusion. Based on Philip Gerrans’ account (this collection), which is an integration of the appraisal theory, the simulation theory, and the predictive coding framework, this commentary aims to argue that the role of memory systems is to update the knowledge of prior probability required for successful predictions. This view of memory systems under the predictive coding framework provides an explanation of how experience is related to the construction of mental autobiographies, how anomalous experience can lead to delusions, and thus how the Cotard delusion arises from depersonalization.

Keywords

Affective processing | Cotard delusion | Depersonalization | Memory | Narrative | Predictive coding framework | Self-awareness | Simulation model