In this commentary I will briefly sketch the notion of “levels of mechanisms” as presented by Carl Craver and propose that we extend it to a more general notion of “level” that ensures wider applicability. The account of levels I develop is essentially based on an account of “properties”, claiming dependence of instantiation on a certain epistemic context. The main goal is then to reconcile Craver's notion of “mechanisms” with “emergence” resulting in a contemporary account of “mechanistic emergence” implementing the developed concept of a level. Such an account could provide explanatory potential for and elucidate on seemingly mysterious higher-level properties and their ontology.
Causation | Descriptive pluralism | Dispositional essentialism | Dualism | Emergence | Epistemic context | Level | Mechanisms | Mechanistic emergence | Mechanistic explanation | New essentialism | Novelty | Ontological novelty | Part–whole relationship | Properties | Property instantiation | Realization | Unexplainability | Unpredictability