In his commentary Engel suggests that the contrast between scaffolded and freestanding judgments that Spener and I applied to introspection might also be usefully applied to intuition. Although I welcome Engel’s attempt to extend the distinction between scaffolded and freestanding judgments beyond its original sphere of application, I have suggested that such a move might not be quite as straightforward as Engel takes it to be, for there don’t appear to be any first-order judgments that might scaffold intuitive judgments in the way that first-order perceptual judgments scaffold certain kinds of introspective judgments. But although I cannot see how the distinction between scaffolded and freestanding judgments might apply to intuition, I certainly share Engel’s conviction that “comparing and contrasting” the epistemology of introspection with that of intuition is a fruitful exercise, for both domains pose the puzzle of how we might reconcile individual certainty and apparent self-evidence with intersubjective disagreement.