Since the linguistic turn the main problems considered by philosophers of mind and language are the questions of how words connect with the world, what relations exist between words and objects, what makes utterances true or false, and how we can extrapolate propositional content from internal mental states on external reality. These are particular questions that stem from the general issue of meaning. Our target article is concerned with the question of grasping the meaning and intention that stands behind expressions in the process of producing and interpreting assertive utterances. Its author argues for the thesis that meaning is context-dependent, but in order to properly grasp the meaning of utterances one does not need to have knowledge-how, characterized by John Searle in the form of so-called “Background”. Instead, the author proposes a neo-Husserlian conception that allows the reading of intentions standing behind assertions, without reference to factors coming from external context—although this is not an internalistic standpoint. However, taking this position he excludes from the relation of intentionality its third element, namely the hearer (interpreter), depriving him of some kind of responsibility for knowledge about factors determining the truthfulness of assertions. He believes that for the hearer to understand literal meaning knowledge-how is not necessary.
This commentary presents four objections against Beyer’s arguments about understanding the meaning of sentences and one separate criticism of his approach to the problem of intentionality. At the beginning I shall reconstruct the thesis and arguments of the author. In the following sections the theses of Beyer will be considered in the light of the general question: what does it mean for meaning to be context-dependent? Here the issue of the differences between contextual and literal meaning will be discussed with reference to Searle’s Background Hypothesis. The line of the argumentation will rest on four objections to Beyer’s claim about the restriction of the Hypothesis, and will focus on: (1) the problem of indexicals; (2) the distinction between literal and contextual meaning; (3) semantic and social externalism; and (4) understanding as epistemic triangle. The last part of the commentary will be concerned with intentionality considered as a triadic relation strongly connected with the model of understanding. This assumption should lead to an answer to the question of why we cannot reduce the requirements of the Background Hypothesis to producers only.
Even at this early stage, according to Beyer’s account, we might ask whether, if the interpreter of the article in question was to misunderstand the article, who has made the mistake—the speaker (producer, author) or the hearer (consumer, reader)? This is another open question that shall accompany this commentary.