Christian Beyer, referring to a combination of Husserl’s and Searle’s theses, proposes an account of meaning that is context-dependent and that expresses not only propositional content but also the intentional state of the speaker. However, he tries to weaken Searle’s Background Hypothesis, which should be restricted only to the speaker. Thus he excludes from the relation of intentional directedness the third element (called either the hearer, interpreter, or consumer). I will argue that if avoiding radical contextualism is right, it cannot be implemented at the cost of the Background Hypothesis and the triadic relation of intentionality.
Background hypothesis | Content | Contextualism | Enactive cognition | Enactivism | Extension | Externalism | First-person perspective | Indexical | Intension | Intentionality | Judgment | Knowledge | Knowledge-how | Meaning | Meaning-function | Possession condition of concepts | Propositional attitudes | Self-identification | Sense | Twin earth thought experiment