In this commentary, I have played the “argumentation game“ as my own version of Eliasmith’s “future game”. The intention behind this was to demonstrate that we very likely need more than sophisticated technology and biologically-inspired hardware to build brain-like models ready to be applied in artificial cognitive agents. As such, I playfully took Eliasmith’s considerations on the future of artificial minds as arguments, and demonstrated that they would result in a petitio principii. In so doing, I highlighted that necessary conditions do not have to be sufficient as well. While this is common philosophical currency, it is instructive to spell this out in the case of artificial agents. So in the present case, what constitutes artificial cognitive systems and what is needed to gain a deeper understanding of how the mind works might include more factors than the two crucial ones Eliasmith outlines, namely biological understanding and its implementation in highly-sophisticated technology. I proposed some possibilities that might turn out to be informative for future considerations on what constitutes an artificial mind. In particular, I mentioned experiential aspects, such as the perception of emotions and reactions to them, as well as internal perceptions like interoceptive awareness. In general, this means that we need theoretical criteria that are convincing for philosophy in order to overcome referring to robust yet convincing social hallucinations. Further, to illustrate that the distinction between natural and artificial systems might not be exhaustive, I pointed to the notions of fragmented minds and postbiotic systems as possible developments for the nearer future. They have to be considered, in particular with respect to their ethical implications, before they are developed and implemented in practice.
Even though we lack a more fine-grained, deeper understanding of what constitutes minds, Eliasmith shows us that it is worth thinking about what we already do have at hand for constructing artificially-minded systems. He demonstrates vividly that two factors—technology and biology—are of major importance on the route to artificially-cognitive, if not minded, agents. And he brings into discussion a number of far-reaching consequences that will apply in case we do succeed in building artificial minds within the next five decades. These will inform the development of these artificial systems as well as philosophical debate, both on an ethical, as well as theoretical level. In this way, Eliasmith’s contribution has to be regarded as significant in terms of preparing us for the decades to come.
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I am grateful to Thomas Metzinger and Jennifer M. Windt for letting me be part of this project, thus providing me a unique opportunity to gain valuable experience. Further special thanks go to the two anonymous reviewers, as well as the editorial reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Lastly, I wish to express my gratitude to Anne-Kathrin Koch for sharing her expertise with me.