From Explanatory Ambition to Explanatory Power

A Commentary on Jakob Hohwy

Commentator

Dominic L. Harkness

dharkness @ uni-osnabrueck.de

Universität Osnabrück

Osnabrück, Germany

Target Author

Jakob Hohwy

jakob.hohwy  @  monash.edu

Monash University

Melbourne, Australia

Editors

Thomas Metzinger

metzinger @ uni-mainz.de

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität

Mainz, Germany

Jennifer M. Windt

jennifer.windt @ monash.edu

Monash University

Melbourne, Australia

The free energy principle is based on Bayesian theory and generally makes use of functional concepts. However, functional concepts explain phenomena in terms of how they should work, not how they in fact do work. As a result one may ask whether the free energy principle, taken as such, can provide genuine explanations of cognitive phenomena. This commentary will argue that (i) the free energy principle offers a stronger unification than Bayesian theory alone (strong unification thesis) and that (ii) the free energy principle can act as a heuristic guide to finding multilevel mechanistic explanations.

Keywords

Active inference | Bayesian enlightenment | Bayesian fundamentalism | Bayesian theory | Free energy | Free energy principle | Functional | Mechanisms | Precision | Prediction errors | Preposterous | Strong unification thesis | Weak unification thesis